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CONTROLLING LAND USES AND PRICES BY USING 
SPECIAL GAIN TAXATION TO INTERVENE IN THE 
LAND MARKET: THE VERMONT EXPERIMENT 
By R. Lisle Baker* 
INTRODUCTION 
Concern over escalating land prices and the increasingly rapid 
conversion of open space to more intensive uses has led to renewed 
interest in taxation as a technique for land use control.l This article 
will discuss in detail one recent tax innovation: the Vermont tax on 
up to 60% of gain realized from short-term sales of land, better 
known as the Vermont land gains tax. 
While land value increment taxation has been a subject of some 
discussion in the past and has become law in several foreign juris-
dictions, the Vermont land gains tax is apparently the first of its 
kind to be enacted in the United States.2 
The land gains tax is so new that hard data about its effects have 
not been accumulated. The tax, however, raises important issues 
about the relation of the land market to the land development pro-
cess, about the participants in that process, and about the rightful 
ownership of appreciation in land values. 
In order to explore these issues more fully, this article will discuss 
the background of the Vermont land gains tax and its test in the 
Vermont courts, analyze the tax in relation to a model of the Ver-
mont land market to estimate the likely effects of the gains tax on 
Vermont land uses and prices, note similar tax innovations now 
being undertaken or considered elsewhere, and, finally, explore 
some of the wider implications of the tax in light of issues raised by 
the Vermont Supreme Court. 
I. THE VERMONT LAND GAINS TAX 
A. Background 
Vermont is a rural state with most of its population of only 
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450,000 scattered in the countryside or in small towns. In such an 
environment, the green valley becomes a community asset over 
which even the regular visitor believes he has acquired a p!'escrip-
tive scenic easement. When such expectations are disrupted by the 
accelerating conversion of open space to more intensive uses, con-
flict results. 
In 1970, the Vermont legislature responded to this conflict by 
enacting Act 250, which provided Vermont with a statewide permit 
system for much of its land development, and required preparation 
of a three-stage statewide land use plan.3 In 1972, Governor Thomas 
Salmon was elected partly because of his support for property tax 
relieffor Vermont landowners and a capital gains tax on land specu-
lation.4 
In April, 1973, the Vermont legislature, with Governor Salmon's 
support, enacted Act 81, providing increased property tax relief with 
partial funding from a new land gains tax.5 
Act 81 expanded the state's existing "circuit breaker" program of 
payments to elderly property taxpayers to include Vermont citizens 
of all ages, including tenants as well as homeowners. The actual 
amount received was to be equal to the excess of the claimant's real 
property taxes (or 20% of his annual household rent) over from 4 to 
6 percent of his household income, with a total payment limit of 
$500 per household.6 Funding for this program was to corne from 
federal revenue sharing, but the Vermont legislature considered al-
ternative supplementary funding measures, including increases in 
the Vermont income tax, sales tax, real estate transfer tax, and the 
imposition of a special capital gains tax.7 The Vermont House Ways 
and Means Committee heard various reasons for the selection of a 
capital gains tax: the control of development,8 the availability of 
profit to tax because of the preferential tax treatment afforded capi-
tal gains for federal and state income tax purposes,9 and the "dis-
couragement of sales of property for speculative reasons, sales and 
transfers of property as a commodity rather than as a portion of a 
social good. . ." 10 
B. What the Tax Provided 
The heart of Chapter 23611 was the rate schedule which placed the 
burden most heavily on the short-term speculator realizing high 
profits from his land sales. 12 
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Gain, as a Percentage 
of Basis (Tax Cost) 
Years Land Held 
by Transferor 0-99% 100-199% 200% or more 
Less than 1 year 30% 45% 60% 
1 year, but less than 2 25% 37.5% 50% 
TAX 
2 years, but less than 3 20% 30% 40% 
RATE 
3 years, but less than 4 15% 22.5% 30% 
4 years, but less than 5 10% 15% 20% 
5 years, but less than 6 5% 7.5% 10% 
In addition to progressive exemptions for long-term holdings, the 
law provided two other primary exemptions: one for gain attributa-
ble to a maximum of one acre of land "necessary for the usc of a 
dwelling used by the taxpayer as his principal residence" and one 
for gain attributable to "buildings or other structures."13 
Not all short-term land transfers are affected. For instance, trans-
fers without consideration or transfers where no gain was recognized 
for purposes of federal income taxation are exempt.14 Moreover, 
since the gains tax followed the federal tax rules for definition of 
basis, land acquiring a stepped-up basis at death for federal tax 
purposes also acquires a stepped-up basis for purposes of the land 
gains tax. Unlike the federal model, however, the Vermont tax pro-
vides no offset for land 10sses.15 
Since the tax applies only to land, a seller must allocate the gain 
on a sale of land containing buildings and other structures between 
the land and the structures on the basis of "fair market value."16 
. The transferor is liable for the tax,17 but the buyer must withhold 
ten percent of the consideration paid for the land and remit it to the 
Vermont Commissioner of Taxes. Within 30 days of the taxable 
transfer, the seller must file a return with the Commissioner setting 
forth the amount of the tax due and enclosing the balance owing or 
making a claim for a refund. ls 
Chapter 236 contains stringent enforcement procedures. Not only 
is the tax due a personal debt of those liable to payor withhold it, 
but it also constitutes a lien in favor of Vermont "upon all property 
i 
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and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to the 
person liable for the tax or for the withholding."19 
Finally, willful attempts to "defeat or evade" the tax result in 
imprisonment and fines for individuals and for "any officer, em-
ployee, director, trustee or other responsible person of a corporation 
or other taxable entity," as well as for anyone who "counsels, aids, 
abets, participates in, or conceals" such conduct. 20 
C. The Challenge to the Gains Tax 
Governor Salmon signed Act 81 into law on April 23, 1973. By Bill 
of Complaint dated Aprjl24, 1973, a Vermont individual, a Vermont 
limited partnership, and a Vermont corporation, all allegedly en-
gaged in the sale or development of Vermont land, began an action 
against Vermont Tax Commissioner Robert Lathrop challenging the 
constitutionality of the tax and requesting an injunction restraining 
the Commissioner from collecting or enforcing it. 21 
Plaintiffs alleged in conclusion that the tax was unconstitutional 
because it had "an obvious purpose of attemption to impede and 
interfere with the ownership, sale, transfer, development and im-
provement of lands within this state."22 
After a hearing, plaintiffs became more specific and requested the 
court to make a finding of fact that 
The reasons for the selection of the method of taxation contained in this 
legislation were to curtail development within the state and obtain the 
needed revenues from land speculators.23 
The Washington County Court declined to make this finding. It 
found that during debate in the Vermont House of Representatives, 
arguments were made that "[the tax] would curtail development 
within the state ... [and] affect the out-of-state land speculator." 
However, the court went on to find that "the impact the tax would 
have on out-of-state land speculators" was "speculative in the ex-
treme."24 The court made other findings offact which, summarized, 
were: (1) Act 81's primary purpose was property tax relief; (2) the 
gains tax was designed to supplement primary funding from federal 
revenue sharing; and (3) the primary purpose of the gains tax was 
to raise revenue to help fund the tax relief program. The court 
concluded: 
Based on the above findings the Court concludes that the presumption 
of constitutionality of any act passed by the legislature has not been 
overcome by any of the facts found by the Court.25 
Plaintiffs then moved to re-open the hearing to present additional 
evidence regarding a June 28, 1973 statement by Governor Salmon: 
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The tax is working in terms of its premier mission which was not so 
much to raise money ... but to substantially slow down rapid subdivi-
sion growth in Vermont, it's done that, and I suspect it will continue to 
do this.26 
Based on this evidence, plaintiffs sought to have the court make 
additional findings of fact that one of the purposes and effects of the 
tax was to slow down subdivision growth in Vermont. Furthermore, 
they requested a conclusion of law that the tax violated both the 
state and Federal Constitutions because it "has had the effect of 
interfering and obstructing the ownership, sale, transfer, develop-
ment and improvement of land."27 
The court found that the Governor had made such a statement, 
but it concluded that since his remarks occurred after the enact-
ment of Act 81, they could have no bearing on the legislative pur-
pose of the tax. 28 
On August 6, 1973, the trial court entered a judgment order dis-
missing plaintiff's complaint.29 Plaintiffs appealed,30 and on 
February 5, 1974, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the Washington County Court.3t 
While most of the Vermont Supreme Court's opinion is discussed 
in the last section of this article, its treatment of plaintiffs' land 
development claims is worth noting here. The court determined that 
deterring speculation through taxation was a constitutionally legiti-
mate state concern so as to justify the variable rate scheme in the 
tax against plaintiffs' equal protection challenge.32 The court added: 
. . . we may take judicial notice of an increasing concern within the 
state over the use and development of land as a natural resource, a 
concern to which the legislature has responded in other instances with 
appropriate legislation [Act 250] . . . . Speculation falls within the 
ambit of such concern as a land use; indeed it has a bearing on many 
other uses to which the land might be put.33 
The court apparently came to its conclusion about the land use 
consequences of speculation without the aid of the trial record or 
argument by either party, at least to the extent that those argu-
ments are reflected in their written briefs. Whether the court's con-
clusion was justified is explored next. 
II. LAND MARKET ANALYSIS 
The effects of the land gains tax in Vermont have not yet been 
measured empirically34 but the fact that it is designed as a variable 
exemption transfer tax on land value increments implies effects on 
the land market. The land market is one of the less studied, yet 
, 
I~-------------------------------
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more important aspects of the land development process because it 
is through the market that much of the fuel for the land develop-
ment-capital gains-is realized.3• 
There are other reasons for examining the land market. A sense 
is emerging that the more traditional land use controls, such as 
zoning and subdivision regulation, affect the land development pro-
cess too late to be more than an accommodation to market decisions 
already made by developers. 36 Hence a desire exists to find a land 
use tool to intervene earlier. Moreover, part of the concern motivat-
ing the Vermont land gains tax (and land value increment taxation 
elsewhere) is the rising cost of landY 
But how does the land gains tax affect the land market? What 
effect does the process of land transfer have on land uses and prices? 
To arrive at an understanding of some answers to these questions, 
it is useful to look at the Vermont land market and then discuss the 
land gains tax in relation to it.3S 
A. Some General Observations about Land Markets 
Land prices are apparently determined by market supply and 
demand.39 While the supply of land, as distinguished from improve-
ments, is relatively fixed (except where dredging and filling opera-
tions can expand it), this supply can be transferred an almost infi-
nite number of times. The transfer process by itself does not use up 
any land, although activities such as subdivision or construction 
may effectively pre-empt a particular parcel for a particular use, 
except where public or private redevelopment occurs. 
Thus, when discussing a transfer tax such as the Vermont land 
gains tax, one should focus on land supply not as the absolute stock 
of buildable land which stock in fact may be shrinking because of 
continuing construction, or private or public land use regulation, as 
discussed below, but on the amount of land offered for sale at a 
particular time. Such a supply is better termed the "effective" sup-
ply of land. 
Another way to describe this effective supply is to assume that the 
amount of land offered for sale at any particular time will increase 
in response to higher offering prices. This response can be plotted 
graphically with price asked constituting a vertical axis and land 
offered, a horizontal axis.40 
The other side of the land market is land demand. The desire of 
potential transferees to purchase land is likely to be affected by a 
variety of factors.41 But as a mirror image of effective land supply, 
the amount of land sought is inversely proportional to price. 
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Individual land parcel sales will occur as a coincidence of a land-
owner's willingness to sell a given acreage at a given price with a 
prospective purchaser's willingness to purchase such acreage at that 
price.42 The aggregate of decisions by individual land market partic-
ipants is called the land market. Effective supply and demand in-
teract through the market to determine land prices and land trans-
ferred. 
Effective land supply, land demand and the land market are all 
illustrated schematically in figures 1-3 below. 
Price 
Per Acre 
Asked 
Price 
Per Acre 
Offered 
The Land Market 
fig. 1: Effective Land Supply 
Acres Offered 
(The amount of land offered for sale 
increases as the price rises.) 
fig. 2: Land Demand 
Acres Asked 
(The amount of land sought 
increases as the price declines.) 
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Price 
Per Acre 
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fig. 3: Land Market 
Al 
Acres Transferred 
(Land prices are set and transfers 
occur when a willingness to sell a 
given acreage at a given price coin-
cides with a willingness to buy at 
that price.) 
B. The Effect of the Land Gains Tax on this Land Market 
A quantitative analysis of the effect of the land gains tax requires 
sophisticated information about the impact of other factors that 
determine land supply and demand. Until such information is ob-
tained from carefully analyzed field research, the best that can be 
done as an introductory analysis is to estimate some of the qualita-
tive effects of the tax. 
1. Supply effects 
Assuming that the amount of land offered for sale plotted against 
the per acre price asked produces an average "effective supply" 
curve, what is the likely effect of the land gains tax? First, it is 
important to point out that some land market participants will not 
be affected by the land gains tax. (See figure 4(a)). These include 
landowners who have held their property longer than six years, some 
residential sellers and those engaging in tax-free transfers.43 Those 
transferors affected44 by the tax may make one of two responses. The 
first is illustrated in figure 4(b). An owner may avoid part or all of 
the tax by withdrawing land from the market, postponing transfers 
until some or all of the six-year holding period has expired.45 An 
alternative response is for the seller to increase the price asked in 
order to cover the amount of the gains tax. This effect is illustrated 
in figure 4(c). 
But not all participants are likely to respond to the tax in the 
same way. Some participants may elect inflation as a response, 
other may elect withdrawal. The composite effect of all the private 
decisions involved is illustrated in figure 4(d) where the supply 
curve has shifted both vertically and horizontally to reflect a com-
posite inflation and withdrawal tax effect.48 
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fig. 4: Possible Effects of the 
Land Gains Tax on Effective Land Supply 
fig. 4(a) : No Tax fig. 4(b): "Withdrawal" Tax Effect 
(Price unaffected, but 
less land offered.) 
Price 
Per Acre 
Asked 
Acres Offered 
Price 
Per Acre 
Asked 
PI 
Acres Offered 
fig. 4(c): "Inflation" Tax Effect 
(Land offering unaffected, 
but price asked increased.) 
Price 
Per Acre P2 ~---' 
Asked 
8 3 81= Effective Supply without 
land gains tax 
81 82 = Effective Supply with land 
gains tax if only "withdrawal" 
occurs 
8 3 = Effective Supply with land 
gains tax if only "inflation" 
occurs 
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A 
Acres Offered 
84 = Effective Supply with land gains 
tax if both "withdrawal" and 
"inflation" occur 
Price 
Per Acre 
Asked 
fig. 4(d): 
P2~----,I 
Pl~--~:....j....-/ 
Composite "Inflation" and 
"Withdrawal" Tax Effect 
(Both price asked and land 
offering affected.) 
A2 Al Acres Offered 
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Which effect-inflation or withdrawal-is likely to dominate is 
uncertain. Some participants in the land market who have high 
holding costs, such as interest payments, may find withdrawal an 
unpalatable alternative. Others with income producing property, 
such as' some farmers, may find withdrawal acceptable. Those to 
whom withdrawal is not a solution may elect to increase their prices. 
Whether such land market participants will be successful may de-
pend on how much competition they will face from offerors of simi-
lar parcels not subject to the gains tax and how much land demand 
will absorb price increments. Thus some participants may find both 
postponement or inflation unfeasible, and may elect in the future 
to invest outside the Vermont land market. 
2. Demand Effects 
The possible effects of the land gains tax on land demand are set 
forth in figure 5. 
Figure 5(a) indicates the amount of demand where no gains tax 
is involved. Figure 5(b) illustrates the withdrawal effect which is 
likely to occur when some potential land market participants decide 
that the risk of land gains taxation on resale of the parcel they 
acquire (and possible tax-induced effects on prices them-
selves-discussed later) makes purchasing Vermont land an unde-
sirable alternative to other investments. Thus the demand schedule 
for those participants would shift to the left along the horizontal 
axis to reflect no change in price but a decline in the amount of land 
sought.47 Conversely, some participants who desire to remain in the 
Vermont land market may choose to lower the prices they are will-
ing to offer land owners in order to offset the anticipated tax which 
they might have to pay upon resale. This deflationary effect of the 
tax, in which the amount of land sought by those participants does 
not decline, but a drop in the offering price occurs, is illustrated in 
figure 5(c). Of course, some participants may elect to absorb any 
future land gains taxes completely and consequently will not change 
their market position, but the number of participants who either 
withdraw from the market or deflate the prices they offer is likely 
in the aggregate to produce a leftward shift in the demand schedule 
with a composite withdrawal and deflationary effect from the tax}8 
This composite effect is illustrated in figure 5(d).48 
THE VERMONT EXPERIMENT 
fig. 5: Possible Effects of the 
Land Gains Tax on Land Demand 
437 
fig. 5 (a) : No Tax 
fig. 5(b) : "Withdrawal" Tax Effect 
(Price unaffected, but 
Price 
Per Acre 
Offered 
Acres Asked 
Price 
Per Acre 
Offered 
PI 
less land sought.) 
D2 Dl 
Acres Asked 
fig. 5(c) : "Deflation" Tax Effect 
(Land sought unaffected, 
but price offered decreases.) 
Price 
Per Acre 
Offered 
PII-D....;;3~_~ 
P21----.......... 
D I = Demand without land gains 
tax 
D2 = Demand with land gains tax 
if only "withdrawal" occurs 
D3 = Demand with land gains tax 
if only "deflation" occurs 
D 4 = Demand with land gains tax 
if both "withdrawal" and 
"deflation" occur 
A Acres Asked 
fig. 5 (d) : Composite "Deflation" 
and "Withdrawal" Tax Effect. 
(Both price offered and land sought 
affected.) 
PIr--T--~ 
Price P 
Per Acre 2 
Offered 
A2 A I Acres Asked 
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3. Composite Effects 
What emerges from the foregoing analysis is a sense that the gain~ 
tax is likely to induce a reduction in both the amount of land offered 
for sale and the land sought for purchase, especially among specific 
participants in the land market, as discussed below. This decline in 
supply and demand may produce further effects on the land market 
illustrated in figure 6. Figure 6(a) illustrates how a land supply 
contraction combined with a land demand contraction can produce 
not only a reduction in the amount of land transferred but also a 
net decline in prices. }4'igure 6(b) shows how a slight adjustment in 
the relative strength in the supply and demand effects of the tax 
produces a net price increase. Thus if supply shifts are more severe 
than demand shifts, prices will rise somewhat, benefiting sellers and 
taxing "buyers". If demand reductions are more severe than supply 
shifts, prices will "fall," benefiting purchasers and levying an addi-
tional "tax" on sellers.5o It is important to note, however, that re-
gardless of the price effect of the gains tax, the number of transfers 
is likely to fall. 61 
fig. 6(a) : Price decline 
because of combined land supply 
and demand effects of land gains 
tax; decline in land transferred. 
Price 
Per Acre 
fig. 6: Possible Effects of the Land 
Gains Tax on Land Prices 
A 2_A1 
Land Transferred 
Price 
Per Acre 
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fig. 6(b) : Price increase because 
of combined supply and demand 
effects of land gains tax; decline 
in land transferred. 
A2 .... Al 
Land Transferred 
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(NOTE: To the extent that the land gains tax modulates land prices, 
it may effect only a change in the rate of increase and not an affirma-
tive reduction, since other factors, such as costs of borrowing, may be 
more important. If an affirmative reduction were to occur because of a 
severe land gains tax-induced drop in land demand, the gains tax ef-
fect itself would be affected since the tax operates only on apprecia-
tion in land values and is most severe at high rates of profitability.) 
The foregoing discussion is potentially misleading in treating even 
the local land market as a monolith. Furthermore, a simple supply 
and demand analysis has inherent limitations in being focused on 
only one frame in time.52 Finally, it does little to illuminate the land 
use consequences of the tax, which the Vermont Supreme Court 
indicated might flow from the tax's likely impact on speculators.53 
Consequently, it may be useful to look at the likely effect of the 
land gains tax on some key Vermont land market participants. Such 
an analysis must deal with several factors. First, while Vermont is 
a predominantly rural state with much of its land in relatively low 
intensities of use, it has recently been subject to intense growth 
pressures, especially from the second-home industry.54 Second, the 
gains tax is fundamentally a transfer tax, with many transfers ex-
empt. Third, the tax was apparently targeted (either prospectively 
or retrospectively) at speculators and subdividers.55 
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C. A Look at the Land Gains Tax and Key Participants in the 
Land Market 
The reasons land is bought and sold are as diverse as the partici-
pants in the market, but it is possible to distinguish at least four 
categories of participants by the dominant motive for their activity. 
1. USERS: Those who purchase and hold land for use (home-
owners, governments) or income (farmers, industries, commercial or 
residential landlords). 
2. SPECULATORS: Those who purchase and hold land for 
transfer after appreciation induced by market forces or new public 
improvements nearby. 
3. SUBDIVIDERS: Those who purchase and hold land for trans-
fer after appreciation in part induced by subdivision, rezoning or 
preconstruction activity they undertake or induce. 
4. BUILDERS: Those who purchase and hold land for transfer to 
users or speculators after construction or renovation of buildings or 
other structures.58 
How is the gains tax likely to affect these participants? 
1. Users as Suppliers of Land. 
Those who purchase and hold land for use or income usually enter 
the land market with the intention of acquiring property for the long 
term. Consequently, it is likely that the length of the users' holding 
period would be higher than that for almost any other class of land 
market participants. Moreover, residential purchasers have the 
additional advantage of a limited exemption from the land gains 
tax. Finally, owners of improved income-producing property may 
find that much of the gain on a sale of such property may be success-
fully attributed to rising demand for the structure (such as in a 
rental apartment complex) and not the land itself. Consequently, 
users probably will not be significantly affected by the land gains 
tax. 
2. Speculators. 
Unlike users who can either derive income from their property, or, 
as in the case of a homeowner, sustain property ownership through 
outside sources of income, the speculator by definition acquires and 
holds land for transfer after appreciation induced by market or other 
forces outside his control. The holding cost for many speculators, 
including property taxes and interest payments, may make it unde-
sirable for them to hold the land for a long period, leading to an 
attempt to raise prices. Others may respond by withdrawing land 
from the market in hopes of waiting out the tax. Consequently, some 
of the shift in the land market supply schedule will be the result of 
speculator decisions. 
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On the demand side, some speculators, especially those with high 
holding costs, are likely either to find long-term holding undesirable 
or to find property subject to land gains taxation to be an unaccept-
able investmentY In either case they may withdraw from the land 
market, as indicated in the original supply and demand analysis. If 
this decline in demand is significant, it may lead to a secondary 
contraction in the amount of Vermont land held by speculators. 
Thus the absolute land supply held by speculators may contract 
over time, leaving more of the Vermont land bank in the hands of 
other market participants. 
3. Subdividers 
Subdividers differ from speculators because they alter what they 
purchase. The alteration may be merely surveying a lot or two for 
resale or it may involve substantial terrain alterations, including 
installation of streets and utilities. As suppliers, some subdividers 
may be able to extract from prospective purchasers certifications 
that a primary residence will be constructed on the lot sold. 58 To 
that extent, such subdividers would not be affected by the land 
gains tax. On the other hand, the land gains tax will have a larger 
impact on those subdividers whose primary market consists of sec-
ond home sites. As a class, subdividers may be more severely af-
fected than speculators because their holding costs after predevelop-
ment construction loans may be significant. Like speculators, sub-
dividers finding the prospect of waiting out the tax unacceptable, 
and inflation an undesirable alternative, may elect to withdraw 
from subdivision activity in Vermont altogether, especially ifspecu-
lators constitute some of the prospective purchasers of subdivided 
land.59 
Subdividers are also likely to be severely affected by the land 
gains tax if much of any gain realized results from the conversion 
of a large "economy-sized" parcel into a collection of smaller, pro-
portionately more expensive lots which must then be quickly sold. 
If many such subdividers decide to leave the Vermont market, the 
result could mean fewer smaller lots offered for sale. Many subdi-
vided lots, however, are not built upon,80 especially in the recrea-
tional subdivision industry. Thus, if subdivider land demand dec-
lines significantly over the long term, the effective supply of subdi-
vided land is likely to undergo a secondary contraction in addition 
to the primary contraction caused by subdividers electing sale post-
ponement or price inflation.81 
4. Builders 
The builder's large capital outlay for construction means that he 
is under more pressure than the subdivider to turn his investment 
around quickly. However, a large portion of the gain on a sale of 
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improved property, as opposed to subdivided property, may be al-
locable to the structure, which is exempt from gains taxation. For 
example, a builder who purchases a lot for $10,000 might erect a 
structure for $40,000 and sell both lot and structure within a year 
for a net return of $60,000. Under the statute, the $20,000 gain 
realized is allocable between the house and the land on the basis of 
fair market value. Even assuming that the land and the structure 
each capture gain in proportion to initial costs, most of the gain will 
still be allocable to the structure, and therefore exempt from the 
tax.12 
Additionally, if the land involved is residential and the seller has 
used or the purchaser intends to use the property for primary resi-
dential purposes, up to ten acres of that land may also be exempt 
from taxation. Consequently, builders are likely to fare much better 
than either subdividers or speculators under the land gains tax. 
5. User-Demand 
User-demand for land may be affected by prospective gains 
taxes. Such an effect is likely to be less significant than, for exam-
ple, the effect on investors, since a user's demand for land is likely 
to be a reflection of his needs for potential income rather than the 
incremental costs of the land gains tax on any potential resale. 
Moreover, as indicated earlier, residential sales involving primary 
homesites will be completely exempt in many cases and partially 
exempt in others where large lots are involved. 
What is the variation in the impact on various land market par-
ticipants likely to mean in terms of land use in Vermont? 
An answer to that question involves a look at the growth cycle. 
m. THE LAND GAINS TAX AND THE GROWTH CYCLE OR TAXING 
TRANSFERS FACILITATING INCREASES IN LAND USE INTENSITY 
A parcel of buildable open space normally has two intensities of 
use-one actual and one possible, with the latter limited by natural 
conditions (such as slope), and private land use regulation (such as 
conservation easements). Land not so limited is likely to be affected 
by public control which can set a relatively low potential use intens-
ity through such devices as large lot zoning. When the possible use 
becomes the actual use what had been merely a latent use intensity 
becomes realized. 
These changes in land use intensity involve transfers either be-
tween several land market participants acting in different capacities 
or two participants acting in a variety of capacities. The transfers 
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involving these shifts in use intensity may be schematically de-
scribed as indicated in figure 7, with land passing from a latent 
through a potential and emergent use until the use is realized 
through construction. 
fig. 7 
Cycle of Land Market 
Transfers Affecting 
Changes in Land Use Intensity 
Users ~ LAND 
--------- ~ BANKERS 
Speculators 
(Potential Intensity) 
Subdividers 
(Emergent Intensity) 
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While a single parcel will rarely move from a latent to a realized 
intensity of use more than once (except where private or public 
redevelopment occurs), the process can be called a cycle because 
the user is both a supplier of buildable open land and purchaser of 
developed properties. (The use of the term "development" is 
avoided as much as possible in this discussion because of the risk 
of confusing preconstruction activity, such as subdivision, with new 
construction, which often occurs at a different point in time and by 
the efforts of a different land market participant.) 
Users and Speculators are designated land bankers since owners 
acting in those capacities do not physically convert land from a 
lower to a higher intensity of use but provide sources from which 
subdividers and builders (land converters-effecting a physical or 
boundary change in the land they hold) might draw. 
While each component in the land market is a potential transferor 
or transferee (the user-user house sale, the speculator-user farmland 
sale), only transfers resulting in an increment in land use intensity 
are illustrated. It should be noted that land does not have to pass 
through the entire cycle. Participants of the system can be bypassed 
(such as the builder who constructs a planned unit development on 
land purchased from a timber company),83 or an owner can elect to 
act in multiple capacities without even transferring land at all (such 
as the farmer who builds a house for his daughter). Thus, each 
participant in the system is a potential transferor or "supplier" of 
land. (i. e., he holds land now which he may transfer) and a potential 
transferee (he does not hold land now but may do so in the future). 
The activity of all participants taken together acting either as 
potential "suppliers" of land or potential "transferees" (i. e., de-
manders of land) is another way of describing the land market. 
How is the land gains tax likely to affect transfers by these partic-
ipants? First, aside from the overall market effects discussed earlier, 
(i.e., modulation of amount of land transferred and modulation of 
land prices), the gains tax may produce a reduction in the number 
of transfers "up" the growth cycle, especially where second homes 
are involved. If the land gains tax affects speculators and second-
home subdividers significantly over the long run, the builder may 
find that he can purchase land directly from users with less competi-
tion from wholesalers and retailers (the speculator and the subdivi-
der). Such a reduction could produce a significant opportunity to 
save transfer costs such as broker's commissions and attorney's fees 
which are often at least 10 percent of the value of each transfer. For 
example: 
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Case #1: A farmer with a ten year holding period sold his 200 acre 
farm in June, 1971 to Speculator for $100,000. In July, 1973, Specu-
lator sells to subdivider for $200,000. Subdivider does $50,000 worth 
of site preparation and sells to second home builder in August, 1974 
for $400,000. Builder does his construction work and sells. off his 
project in September, 1975 for several million with $500,000 alloca-
ble to the land. In each transfer, transfer costs (broker's commis-
sions, etc.) are assumed to be 10 percent of the sale price. (Few land 
development projects are likely to be sold wholesale but the hypo-
thetical is designed to illustrate the transfer effects.) 
Case #2 is the same as Case #1 except that the farmer sells to 
builder in 1971 and builder spends $50,000 on site preparation. 
Case #3 is the same as Case #1 except that the farmer sells to 
builder in 1973 and builder does $50,000 worth of site preparation. 
These three situations are set out in tabular form in figure 8. 
fig. 8 ~ ~ 
m 
Case #1 
Sale Site Transfer Taxable 
Year Transfer Price Preparation Costs Gain Rate Tax 
1971 Farmer-Investor $100,000 $ 0 $ 10,000 $ 0 0 $ 0 
1973 Investor-Subdivider 200,000 0 20,000 80,000 20% 16,000 trj 
1974 Subdivider-Builder 400,000 50,000 40,000 110,000 25% 27,500 Z 
< 1975 Builder-User 500,000 0 50,000 50,000 25% 12,500 Ea 
Total $120,000 $240,000 $56,000 0 Z 
Case #2 ~ trj 
1971 Farmer-Builder $100,000 $ 0 $10,000 0 0 0 Z t-3 
1975 Builder-User 500,000 50,000 50,000 300,000 20% 60,000 > t"1 
Total $60,000 > ~ 
~ 
Case #3 ~ 1973 Farmer-Builder $200,000 $ 0 $20,000 0 0 0 00 
1975 Builder-User 500,000 50,000 50,000 200,000 40% 80,000 
Total $70,000 
NOTE: If the growth cycle middlemen can be bypassed, the oppor-
tunity for profits at the end may increase, in large measure 
because the transfer costs of the intermediate sales can be 
minimized. 
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The table indicates how important transfer costs can be as a 
component of land prices. To the extent that the gains tax causes 
such transfer costs to be reduced, it may perform a considerable 
service. 
The transfer costs thus saved can mean more profits for either the 
farmer-user or the builder (or both), assuming that demand for the 
builder's finished product is not likely to be significantly affected 
by the gains tax. 
But such an analysis, while useful to indicate the importance of 
transfer costs in the land development process, assumes that the 
user-farmer can get at least the same amount for his land before the 
gains tax as after. Is this assumption accurate? If he loses some 
subdividers or speculators as part of his available market or others 
offer him lower prices because of the tax's deflationary effect (dis-
cussed above) will he be able to sell? If he must sell, will the sale 
be at a distress price? In other words, how necessary are the growth 
cycle intermediaries as a means of private price supports for the 
primary user?84 
The answer to that question depends on whether the effect of 
gains tax-induced inflation and withdrawal on other users causes 
the shift in the effective land supply to match or exceed any shift 
in land demand. The drop-out effect so postulated will probably not 
be as severe on the user-seller as one might expect because some 
user-sellers will elect either to inflate their price or withdraw from 
the market temporarily. Thus, while the aggregate demand for land 
may decrease through the loss of certain market participants, the 
aggregate effective supply will also have dropped, leaving the farmer 
who must sell in a more favored position than otherwise anticipated. 
Similarly, builders should not find their market severely curtailed, 
primarily because of the residential homesite exemption, and also 
because the land gains tax would constitute a relatively small part 
of their overall investments. Moreover, the transfer cost savings 
available to builders through growth cycle bypass may enable them 
to offer higher prices, leading to a lesser shift in land demand than 
might otherwise occur. Again, certainty will have to await empirical 
research, but at this point, it seems that the demand effects of the 
tax on primary users who wish to sell may not be as harsh as antici-
pated. 
While earlier supply and demand analysis indicated that the land 
gains tax would produce an overall modulation in land prices, am-
plifying that analysis by looking at the growth cycle indicates that 
such a modulation may take place predominately at the expense of 
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the speculator and subdivider and not at the expense of the user or 
the builder. Thus the gains tax could have the unusual effect of 
making possible lower land prices for the ultimate users of improved 
land while increasing the bargaining room of those builders who 
purchase unsubdivided land, meaning high prices in some cases for 
user-sellers of unsubdivided land. 
Aside from the considerable saving produced by eliminating the 
transfer costs of moving land "up" the growth cycle (which can 
distress only brokers or others who live off the land transfer process), 
the land gains tax may have an important environmental benefit in 
removing some subdividers from the land market. 
To the extent that the gains tax reduces the relative amount of 
land moving into the hands of subdividers, the gains tax will have 
accomplished one of Governor Salmon's objectives and helped move 
Vermont land out of the "lot first" development pattern, which 
often results not only in an unsound land use plan for a subdivided 
parcel but also in a significant number of lots that are never used 
for construction but are no longer virgin open space.65 
It is important to note that even with the expanded homesite 
exemption enacted in 1974, the land gains tax will apply to precisely 
the large lot subdivisions that do not now come under the Act 250 
process.66 Hence the gains tax may be a complement to Act 250. 
While the gains tax may not significantly affect the amount of 
construction in Vermont-indeed the structural exemption may 
stimulate some investors to move into structures if they withdraw 
from land-the six year holding period and the slow-down in second 
home subdivision are likely to afford greater opportunities for care-
fulland-use planning, both for particular parcels and for the state 
itself. 
Finally, the structural exemption, as well as the difficulty of mak-
ing allocations of gain between new construction and land, is likely 
to permit and perhaps even encourage land owners to improve struc-
tures on their land without anxiety that portions of the increments 
in value will be captured by the state should a sale occur. 
To summarize, the structure of the land gains tax implies that the 
tax will have a beneficial effect on the rate at which open land is 
converted from latent to realized intensities of use, with the most 
significant slowdown occurring at the level of emergent use intensi-
ties. The gains tax is also likely to permit more opportunities for 
users and builders to bypass investors and subdividers-the land 
market middlemen. 
Together these projected effects indicate that some open Vermont 
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land which might be purchased by speculators or subdividers will 
remain in its current use. This can have important effects to the 
extent that such land is used for agricultural purposes.87 
Do the conclusions of the model bear any relation to what has 
actually happened in Vermont? Until some broad-ranging research 
can be undertaken, it is difficult to judge, but it may be useful to 
look at some indications provided by facts currently available. 
Since 1968, Vermont has had a property transfer return which 
must be filed whenever a deed evidencing a transfer of title to real 
property is delivered to the town clerk for recording. The town clerk 
cannot record the deed unless it is accompanied by a completed 
return and the tax owed, if any. Except for certain exempt transfers, 
the amount due is .005 of the price paid for the property.8S 
The following table indicates what these transfer tax returns re-
veal about Vermont real estate both before and after passage of the 
land gains tax. 
Vermont Real Estate Sales 
As Indicated by Vermont 
Property Transfer Returns 
(The Vermont Property Tax Return Statute 
became effective January 1, 1968.) 
Fiscal Year 
(July 1 - June 30) 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1960-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74* 
Number of 
transfers 
involving pay-
Percent change ment of trans-
Dollar Amount in Dollar Amount fer tax** 
$230,638,000 
$206,431,000 
$226,992,000 
$332,312,000 
$405,879,000 
$323,550,000 
Not Available 
-10% 
+10% 
+46% 
+22% 
-20% 
Not Available 
Not Available 
16,630 
21,032 
21,550 
16,130 
(*The land gains tax became effective on May 1, 1973. 
**Because of a number of exemptions, in some cases no transfer tax 
may be due even though a return is filed. The Vermont Department of 
Taxes presently has figures for only those returns reflecting a transfer tax 
payment.)89 
As indicated by the model, the number of transfers declined after 
passage of the land gains tax. But is this properly attributable to 
the land gains tax or to other causes? 1973-74 marked a severe credit 
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crunch involving both high interest rates and tight money. Conse-
quently, while the figures could be taken to confirm the economic 
analysis, judgment should be withheld until more sophisticated 
field information can be collected and analyzed. 
In addition, the land gains tax has not resulted in the amount of 
revenue originally anticipated, producing $1,288,520 in tax liability 
for fiscal year 1973-74.70 But again, without more data it may be a 
mistake to ascribe the shortfall to the transfer-reducing and price-
modulating effects of the gains tax predicted by the model. 
Having looked at the land gains tax in terms of the land market 
and its land use consequences, we turn to innovations in other juris-
dictions. 
IV. LAND VALUE INCREMENT TAXATION 
The Vermont land gains tax is not an entirely new idea,71 but 
merely the first domestic appearance of a special tax on land value 
increments. A tax almost identical to the 1973 Vermont version was 
narrowly defeated in Montana in 1974.72 Another version, known as 
a Land Sales Excise Tax, was proposed in Washington in 1975. This 
tax involves a rate unaffected by profitability of the sale, beginning 
with a rate of fifty percent for transfers with a holding period of less 
than a year. Also, while the Vermont land gains tax provided a 
"straight-line" rate drop as the Seller's holding period increased 
(with no tax due after the sixth year), the Washington tax rate 
declines slowly, not reaching 25% until the fourth year of the holding 
period has passed. The severity is offset by providing a one percent 
increment in basis for each month of the seller's holding period. 
Another feature of the bill is an agricultural exemption for sales of 
land that have been actively farmed. 73 
Outside the United States, land value increment taxation has 
recently appeared in three British Commonwealth jurisdictions.74 In 
Ontario, Canada, the tax has taken the form of a 1974 "Land Specu-
lation Tax" on 50% of the gain derived from nonexempt "disposi-
tions" of land, essentially transfers by nonresidential sellers who fail 
to significantly improve the land they sell. The aim was to take the 
steam out of Ontario land price escalation.75 
In New Zealand, the concept of land value increment taxation 
takes the form of the Property Speculation Tax. Here, unlike Ver-
mont, gain on structures is also taxed-beginning at a 90% rate for 
dispositions within six months of acquisition and declining to 60% 
for disposition within two years, with dispositions thereafter ex-
empt.78 
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Finally, the British have recently begun to tax gains derived from 
the disposal of certain land and buildings at ordinary income rather 
than capial gains rates. 77 
V. THE IMPLICATION OF STATE LAND VALUE INCREMENT TAXATION 
Some of the important issues raised by devices such as the Ver-
mont Land Gains Tax were discussed in the challenge to the tax in 
the Vermont Supreme Court. As noted above, the Vermont Su-
preme Court upheld the tax against its challenge by Vermont land 
developers.78 Much of the court's opinion, specifically the challeng-
ers' primary claim of denial of equal protection of the laws, has 
already been discussed elsewhere and will not be duplicated here.79 
Several key issues, however, remain to be analyzed. 
A. The Exclusionary Issue 
One of these issues was the alleged "exclusionary" effects of the 
land gains tax, which the Andrews court framed as follows: 
. . . since nonresidents receive no benefits from the property tax relief 
provisions of the statute, they are deterred from purchasing land subject 
to the gains tax; thus, the sellers' market available to such nonresident 
purchasers is limited unless they are willing to pay the tax, and the 
available buyers' market of prospective transferors whose land is subject 
to the tax is also limited. SO 
The court disposed of this argument by noting that the appellant 
"has failed to introduce any evidence to establish that such discrim-
ination in fact occurs, and so has failed to meet his burden as to 
these allegations."81 But even if the appellants had produced the 
needed evidence, they appeared to be confusing the property tax 
relief provisions of Act 81 with the land gains tax. Certainly it is 
difficult to conceive that individuals affluent enough to afford a 
second home in Vermont would be significantly deterred from pur-
chasing such a home because they would not qualify for property tax 
relief, especially since their household incomes are likely to exceed 
the tax relief threshold anyway. 
If appellants meant to argue that the primary residence homesite 
exemption provided in the land gains tax deters out-of-state pur-
chasers, the argument seems unpersuasive. This exemption, if it 
provides an incentive at all, induces such a purchaser to become a 
Vermont domiciliary, not remain a nonresident. Moreover, it is 
worth noting that second-home development, at least in neighbor-
ing New Hampshire, will apparently receive less judicial protection 
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from exclusionary land use controls than that afforded primary 
home development.82 Finally, appellants argued (though it is not 
reflected in the Supreme Court opinion) that the gains tax was 
designed to deter out-of-state speculators.83 Appellees replied that 
all speculators were deterred regardless of residence,84 and thus 
partially echo the land market analysis made earlier in this article. 
B. The Taking Issue 
A second important aspect involves the "taking" issue. The plain-
tiffs in their original bill of complaint alleged that the land gains 
tax violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking pri-
vate property for public use without just compensation. However, 
they did not elaborate in their bill on the nature of the interference 
with this constitutional provision.85 In their later briefs, appellants 
abandoned the taking issue altogether (except in the guise of a 
double taxation argument) and the court did not take it up itself.88 
Nonetheless, because it raises questions about the ownership of ap-
preciation in land values, the issue is worth exploring further. 
The invalidation of a tax as an unconstitutional taking is an ex-
tremely rare event. So far such invalidation has apparently been 
und.ertaken on three rationales: just compensation, government 
competition and tax-shifting. 
1. The Just Compensation Rationale 
The just compensation argument has emerged in two areas-the 
incorporation of a taxing district and the special assessment. As an 
example of the first, the territorial legislature of Utah, by special 
act, included within the corporate limits of the town of Moroui City 
some 16,000 acres ofland, including 160 acres owned by one Daniels. 
Daniels refused to list his farm for tax assessment. He defended 
against his conviction for violating the listing law on the ground that 
his property was located far beyond the circle of city improvements 
and beyond the range of city police. The Supreme Court of Utah 
reversed his conviction, holding that the tax constituted a taking of 
his property for which he received no compensation in services.87 
The court construed the Fifth Amendment bar against the taking 
of private property "for public use without just compensation" 
broadly: 
The government may appropriate the property of the individual when 
necessary in one of three ways: First, by taking in the mode prescribed 
after paying the owner for it; second, by estimating the benefits to the 
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owner's property from the improvements to be made, and taking the 
amount estimated in money; third, by taking the property in the form 
of money by the methods of taxation for which the benefits of protection 
and other advantages are furnished by the government. The same prin-
ciple underlies all these methods. When the property is taken under the 
right of eminent domain, the public pays the owner in money; when 
money is exacted by means of a special assessment, the owners are 
compensated in special benefits to their property by public improve-
ments made in its expenditure; and when money is exacted by a general 
tax, the payer is compensated in the benefits received from the 
government in any and all of the ways that a government may benefit 
society. Thus the individual is compensated for the property he parts 
with, whether it consists of lands or money or other property.88 
The Daniels case, however, apparently represents a minority 
view. SO 
The other category of cases, in which the just compensation argu-
ment has been more successfully invoked, involves special assess-
ments where the assessment made allegedly exceeded or was dispro-
portionate to the benefit received. The most well-known of these is 
Norwood v. Baker,oo in which the village of Norwood, Ohio assessed 
upon land abutting each side of a new street an amount covering 
"not simply a sum equal to that paid for the land taken for the 
street, but in addition, the cost and expenses connected with the 
condemnation proceedings." In invalidating the excess assessment, 
the Supreme Court of the United States reasoned: 
In our judgment, the exaction from the owner of private property of the 
cost of a public improvement in substantial excess of the special benefits 
accruing to him is, to the extent of such excess, a taking, under the guise 
of taxation, of private property for public use without compensation. We 
say "substantial excess," because exact equality of taxation is not al-
ways attainable, and for that reason the excess of cost over special 
benefits, unless it be of a material character, ought not to be regarded 
by a court of equity when its aid is invoked to restrain the enforcement 
of a special assessment.D1 
2. The Government Competition Rationale 
A second theory for invalidating a tax is that a "taking" has 
occurred when the government uses its powers of taxation in a puni-
tive way to benefit its dominantly proprietary activities. The only 
apparent case in which this theory has been advanced is Alco Park-
ing Corp. v. City of Pittsburgh. 02 In that case, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court struck down a 20 percent gross receipts tax on all 
commercial parking garages in Pittsburgh on the ground that the 
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tax, which combined high rates with direct governmental competi-
tion in the form of a public parking authority charging lower rates, 
was confiscatory. The court noted that two prior challenges to park-
ing lot gross receipts taxes93 had been turned aside because the 
aggrieved taxpayers had failed to produce sufficient evidence estab-
lishing two "essential elements" before a tax can be held to be 
confiscatory: 
First the taxpayer must show that more than "an occasional operator 
cannot afford to continue in business" ... Secondly, he must show that 
the tax cannot be passed on to the consumer. 94 
In the Alco case itself, the court determined that while the appel-
lants had shown on the record that more than an occasional operator 
could not afford to continue in business, that alone was insufficient 
to overturn the tax. But the fact of direct public competition proved 
that the tax could not be passed on to parking lot customers, since 
such competition made a rate increase virtually impossible. The 
court relied on the theory, advanced by Professor Sax, that when the 
government acts as an appropriator for its own use a "taking" has 
occurred.95 
In July, 1974, the Supreme Court of the United States decided its 
first tax/taking case in many years and overruled the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's decision in Alco.98 
The Court noted that neither the parties nor the Pennsylvania 
court differed with the principle that a tax could not be overturned 
on due process grounds even where it is so excessive as to bring 
about the destruction of a particular business, following their earlier 
holding in Magnano Co. v. Hamilton. 97 The decision, however, 
turned on whether the Alco situation involved one of those "rare and 
special instances"98 where the taxing statute is 
so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve an 
exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, 
the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as for example, 
the confiscation of property. 99 
The Court did not agree that government competition was enough 
to invalidate the tax, citing Puget Sound Co. v. Seattle,IOO a 1934 
case upholding a city gross receipts tax imposed on a power and 
light company at the same time the city was actively competing 
with the company in furnishing power. IOI 
The Court did not completely eliminate government competition 
as a rationale for invalidating a tax on "taking" grounds,102 but it 
did not further define what the "rare and special instances" might 
be. 
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3. The Tax-Shifting Rationale 
A third theory for invalidating a tax is that the tax drives out the 
affected business because the tax cannot be shifted to the consumer. 
Neither the just compensation nor the governmental competition 
ground would be easily available to challengers to the Vermont land 
gains tax. Note, however, that before adopting the competition ra-
tionale, the Pennsylvania court indicated that for a tax to be held 
confiscatory, the taxpayer must demonstrate both that more than 
an occasional operator cannot afford to continue in business and 
that the tax cannot be passed on to the consumer. lOS 
The court was speaking in the context of a gross receipts tax on 
parking garages. Nevertheless, could the Andrews plaintiffs have 
claimed successfully by way of analogy that more than an occasional 
land speculator or subdivider could not afford to continue in busi-
ness and could not pass the tax on to the consumer? 
The holding costs for undeveloped landl04 plus the burden of the 
gains tax might satisfy the first test because some land market 
participants could no longer afford to stay in business. The second 
test might be satisfied if competition from long-term holders of 
similar parcels and a gains-tax induced drop in land demand meant 
the tax could not be shifted forward. Even so, the twin Alco tests 
would still meet the Supreme Court's view that a tax could legiti-
mately destroy a business. In Magnano itself, a tax on butter substi-
tutes would have met the same tests. Consequently, Magnano 
would be controlling if a Fifth Amendment challenge were made on 
the twin Alco tests. 105 Moreover, it is hard to conceive that a "tak-
ing" occurs in the land gains tax case when the "taking" is at least 
avoidable by waiting out the holding period. 
C. The Regulation Issue 
Finally, could the Andrews plaintiffs have been more successul if 
they had sought to establish (1) that the tax was merely regulation 
in the guise of a tax and (2) as a regulation, if not as a tax, the land 
gains tax constituted an unlawful "taking"? The Andrews court 
never decided that issue because plaintiffs did not raise it. 
While the Andrews plaintiffs spent a great deal of time and effort 
trying to persuade the trial court of the tax's effect on land develop-
ment in the state,106 they also attacked the validity of the tax on the 
ground of improper enactment. Having thus framed the issue 
around the constitutionality of a revenue-producing tax with ancil-
lary regulatory objectives, rather than vice-versa, they made it eas-
ier for the Vermont Supreme Court to follow Magnano and uphold 
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the legitimacy of land use regulation through taxation, even though 
the court implied that it might not have sustained the tax as bare 
regulation. 107 
D. Land Gains Taxation, Transferable Development Rights and 
the Landowner's Entitlement to Land Value Appreciation 
Even if the land gains tax might have withstood a "taking" chal-
lenge, the issue raises interesting questions about the rightful own-
ership of appreciation in land value. If that appreciation is not 
"property," then no taking has occurred. In this regard, a number 
of commentators have noted a trend toward a view of land as a 
resource rather than a commodity. lOS The recent proliferation of 
environmentally-based controls imposed at even the federallevepo9 
has prompted warnings of a backlash from aggrieved landowners 
who find the rewards going to a favored and diminishing few who 
can jump the increasing number of barrels on the land development 
iceYo 
In order to deal with this problem commentators have been focus-
ing on the idea of transferable development rights as a means of 
preserving urban landmarks, \11 open space and farmland,112 environ-
mentally fragile areas,113 or as a means of dealing with the equal 
protection aspects of the taking issue generally. 114 
Transferable development rights proposals generally involve ei-
ther government acquisition in districts where development is unde-
sired followed by resale to developers in transfer districts or govern-
ment restriction in preservation districts, followed by free market 
transfer of the restricted right to owners in transfer districts. An 
extended discussion of the merits and demerits of transferable de-
velopment rights is beyond the scope of this article. 115 In short, 
however, the scheme is predicated on the assumption that the owner 
of land is entitled to profit from it, or as Professor Carmichael has 
put it: 
Development and redevelopment will doubtless continue to be a 
strongly protected incident of land ownership. This incident is certainly 
a principal basis of expectations within our system of private ownership 
rights, and its destruction would not be tolerated. 1I6 
It seems likely that the widespread adoption of some form ofTDR 
scheme would fulfill his prophecy since even landowners barred 
from developing their land by sound environmental or other regula-
tion would still profit by its nondevelopment. 
If land is going to be viewed as something precious in which future 
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generations have a legitimate interest which should be protected, it 
may be premature to enshrine the current owner's development 
expectancy into alienable and publicly protected "rights." A 
counter-current is at work, fueled by the widening understanding of 
ecological principles,1I7 promoted by social theorists,1I8 given re-
spectability by commentators,119 and supported by court decisions 
such as the famous case of Just v. Marinette County.120 In the Just 
case, the court redefined the owner's property entitlement, in the 
context of a county ordinance barring lakeshore land filling without 
a permit, to land in its "natural state."121 
In the view of the counter-current, changes in land use intensity 
are presumptively "ameliorative waste"122 of the interests of later 
generations rather than "development" or "improvements."123 
Pending a resolution of this fundamental question of the owner's 
entitlement to profit from changes in the intensity of the use of his 
land, it is useful to ponder the Vermont land gains tax. Rather than 
choosing one school of thought over the other, the land gains tax 
implies a concern for the legitimate land use interests of future 
generations and also a recognition that land in Vermont still is very 
much a commodity. It consequently taxes only some appreciation 
in land value, then only as realized, and even then only that appre-
ciation that seems "unearned." Until the "new property" emerges, 
the tax may be a useful intermediate step.124 
Finally, the land gains tax helps to focus on how taxation relates 
to the other two principal tools of land use control-condemnation 
and regulation. 
When eminent domain is involved, the government compensates 
the affected landowner. When regulation occurs, neither pays (di-
rectly). But when taxation occurs, the affected landowner pays the 
government. As noted above, however, the courts defer to govern-
mental exercise of the taxing power as long as equal protection 
issues are met and "confiscation," as yet relatively undefined, has 
not occurred. Thus until more guidance is forthcoming from courts 
or commentators, governments who want land use controls that help 
pay their way are likely to look at taxation in general and the 
Vermont Land Gains Tax in particular. 
CONCLUSION 
The Vermont land gains tax is an unproven but promisinginnova-
tion in the arsenal of land use controls. It intervenes in the land 
market-a market that may have had more influence on land uses 
than many realize. Unlike most conventional land use controls and 
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property tax exemptions, the land gains tax affects both land de-
mand125 and land supply-not just supply alone. The exemption 
structure of the tax targets it effects most heavily on the speculator 
and the subdivider, the middlemen in the growth cycle, improving 
chances for profit and planning for land users and builders. The tax 
raises questions as to who owns the appreciation in land value and 
as to the nature of entitlements to make changes in land use intensi-
ties. Furthermore, it leads to renewed examination of taxation as a 
device for land use control. Finally, it may lead land use planners 
and tax collectors for a jurisdiction to begin to think of ways that 
they can work toward similar, rather than separate and often con-
flicting, goals. 
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J. 279 (1968); Gurko, Federal Income Taxes and Urban Sprawl, 48 
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England Natural Resources Center, Boston, Massachusetts. 
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Vermont 23 ME. L. REv. 315 (1971). 
Briefly stated, Act 250 provided that: 
No person shall sell or offer for sale any interest in any subdivision 
. . . or commence construction on a subdivision or development, or 
commence development without a permit. 10 V.S.A. § 6081(a)(1969). 
The state was divided into nine regions, each with a specifically 
appointed district commission which was to hear application for 
development permits and evaluate them on a variety of criteria, 
including environmental and aesthetic considerations, impact on 
local public facilities, and conformity to local and land use plans. 
10 V.S.A. § 6086 (1974). While "development" was defined to in-
clude both construction of improvements for commercial and in-
dustrial purposes on parcels of more than 10 acres in size, (or one 
acre if within a municipality lacking permanent subdivision and 
zoning controls), and housing projects (such as condominiums) of 
more than 10 units, subdivisions did not come within the Act 250 
process unless 10 or more lots of less than 10 acres were involved. 
10 V.S.A. §§ 6001(3), (11) and (19) (1973). Thus, as has been 
pointed out, a 45 acre tract could be divided into nine 5 acre lots or 
four 11.25 acre parcels, and still be exempt. Walter, supra note 3, 
at 322. See also, Vermont State Planning Office, A Progress Report 
on Vermont's Land Use Plan (Feb. 1974). 
4 Myers, supra note 3 at 34. 
5 Act 81 of the 1973 Vermont laws, amending 32 V.S.A. §§ 5951, 
5960(e), 5967-68, 5973; adding 32 V.S.A. §§ 5976-77 and 32 V.S.A. 
§§ 10001-10010; repealing 32 V.S.A., § 5966. Act 81 also set aside 
the first $500,000 collected each fiscal year under the gains tax for 
property mapping. Act 81 (1973). 32 V.S.A. § 3409 (1967) required 
the state to undertake property mapping, but funding had appar-
ently not been available until Act 81. Conversation with Vermont 
Tax Commissioner Robert Lathrop on September 12, 1974. Com-
missioner Lathrop considers the property mapping program funding 
by the land gains tax to be one of the key benefits of the tax. When 
the process, (involving orthophoto base maps achieved in part 
through high resolution aerial photography) is complete, the state 
will have a base map which will be invaluable not only for property 
tax but also for land planning purposes. 
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8 The rebate claimant must be a Vermont domiciliary and not a 
full time student claimed as a dependent by another taxpayer for 
federal income tax purposes. 
A household income (defined more broadly than federal taxable 
income) of $4,000 or less qualifies for a rebate if the tax or rent 
portion paid exceeds 4 percent. This income percentage increases 
gradually to a ceiling of six percent for incomes over $16,000. For 
example: A Vermont citizen is 70 years old and has a household 
income, including social security, of $3,500. She pays $1,200 a year 
in rent. Her "tax" is 20 percent of her rent or $240. Four percent of 
her income is $140. She qualifies for a rebate of $100. Claimants 65 
and over have first claim on the property tax relief fund. 32 V.S.A. 
§ 5976-7 (1973). 
If Vermont household incomes correspond to the northeast region 
of the United States, the tax relief program is likely to primarily 
benefit households with incomes below $10,000. A table prepared for 
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations indicates 
that 1970 real estate taxes on owner-occupied family homes in the 
northeast region constituted an average of 5.3 percent of family 
incomes of between $10,000 and $15,000 and up. Shannon, The 
Property Tax: Reform or Relief, in PROPERTY TAX REFORM 27 (G. 
Peterson ed. 1973). 
7 Record at 33, Andrews v. Lathrop, 315 A.2d 860 (Vt. 1974). 
8 House Committee Hearing, January 16, 1973 (remarks of Tax 
Commissioner Robert Lathrop), Id. Record at 27. 
9 House Committee Hearing, February 22, 1973 (remarks of Nor-
ris Hoyt, the Governor's Special Counsel and one of the principal 
draftsmen of the land gains tax). Id. Record at 24. 
10 House Committee Hearing, February 22, 1973 (remarks of Jon-
athan Brownell). Id. Record at 28. 
11 32 V.S.A. §§ 10001-10010 (1973). 
12 32 V.S.A. § 10003 (1973). 
13 32 V.S.A. § 10002 (1973). The cost of improvements to the land, 
such as roads, sidewalks, sewer and water systems, increase basis. 
Vermont Land Gains Tax Reg. No. § 1.10005(a)-1. 
14 32 V.S.A. §§ 10004(a), 10oo5(c) (1973). 
15 32 V.S.A. § 10005(a), (e) (1973). 
18 32 V.S.A. § 1oo05(b) (1973). The Vermont Land Gains Tax 
Regulations provide no additional guide as to how this allocation is 
to be made. 
17 32 V.S.A. § 10006 (1973). 
18 32 V.S.A. § 10007 (1973). The statute provides that the trans-
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feror may pay any tax due in advance or if no tax is due, obtain a 
ruling to that effect in advance from the Commissioner. Upon re-
ceipt of certification to either payment or no tax due from the Com-
missioner, the buyer is relieved from his withholding obligation. 32 
V.S.A. § 10007(c). 
19 32 V.S.A. § 10007(d), (e) (1973). 
20 32 V.S.A. § 10010(b) (1973). 
21 Record at 2-9, Andrews v. Lathrop, 315 A.2d 860 (Vt. 1974). 
Plaintiffs' bill made two principal allegations: (1) as a revenue 
bill, the gains tax was improperly enacted because it failed to origi-
nate in the Vermont House of Representatives as required by Chap-
ter 2, section 6 of the Vermont Constitution; and (2) the gains tax 
rate schedule and exemptions made the tax unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory under the equal protection provisions of the Vermont 
and U.S. Constitutions. 
22 Id. Record at 7. Plaintiffs did not elaborate as to how a land 
development aim or result rose to the level of a constitutional defect 
except in the argument on appeal that anti-development impact 
lacked an alleged constitutionally requisite nexus to property tax 
relief. 
23 Id. Record at 26. At the same time, plaintiffs, in an effort to 
strengthen their claim of constitutional invalidity because of defec-
tive enactment, made a request to the court that it find that a 
primary purpose of the act was to raise revenue. 
24 Id. Record at 35. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. Record at 40-42. 
27 Id. Record at 41-42. 
28 Id. Record at 44. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. Record at 45. 
31 Andrews v. Lathrop, 315 A.2d 860 (Vt. 1974). 
32 Id. at 863. While the court agreed with the trial judge that 
statements of individual legislators and others as to the purpose of 
thc land gains tax was of "doubtful relevance to the present 
inquiry," its own analysis of the structure of the tax indicated a 
legislative aim to discourage the rapid turnover of land at high 
profits. Thus the court seemed to have agreed with appellants' 
claim of an anti-speculation statutory purpose without accepting 
the evidence introduced at trial to substantiate it. 
33 Andrews v. Lathrop, 315 A.2d 860 (Vt. 1974). For discussion of 
Act 250, see supra note 3. 
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While the developers lost in court, they won a small victory in the 
1974 session in the Vermont legislature. By legislation effective July 
1, 1974, section 10002 of chapter 236 was amended by providing that 
the residential exemption was raised to a maximum of five acres. 
Moreover, that exemption was extended not only to individuals 
already owning a primary residence in Vermont at the time of sale, 
but also to purchasers who intended the subject dwelling to become 
their principal residence. To qualify for that exemption, the pur-
chaser must execute a form supplied by the Commissioner of Taxes 
certifying that he is domiciled in Vermont or the property will be 
used as his principal residence and that he understands that as a 
Vermont domiciliary, all of his income is subject to Vermont income 
tax laws. 
The burden on subdividers was also alleviated somewhat. The 
amendment provided that where there is no existing dwelling com-
pleted and fit for occupancy as the purchaser's principal residence 
at the time of transfer of title, the purchaser can certify that con-
struction on the dwelling will commence within a year of the date 
of transfer of title and will complete it and occupy it within two 
years of transfer. The deed or other transfer instruments must also 
state the amount of tax which the transferor had been relieved of 
by virtue of the purchaser's certification, and if any of the certifica-
tions turn out to be untrue, the Commissioner can collect from the 
buyer the tax upon profit allocable to the wrongly excluded land. 
Finally, if local zoning ordinances require minimum lot sizes of 
larger than five acres up to ten acres of such minimum lot sizes may 
be excluded for purposes of residential exemptions. 32 V.S.A. § 
10002 (1974) amending 32 V.S.A. § 10002 (1973). 
To minimize collection problems caused by the change in the law, 
the Vermont Department of Taxes has attempted to use lenders to 
help in enforcing compliance. The Department has taken the posi-
tion that normally a state lien for the tax will not arise on the land 
conveyed until the state gives appropriate notice to the buyer and 
seller and makes a filing in the town land records. Vermont Land 
Gains Tax Reg. No. 1.10007-3(a). Such a provision eases the diffi-
culty of satisfying purchaser's lenders that no liens exist on property 
conveyed at the time of conveyance. But in the case of a sale of raw 
land to a purchaser who alleges an intent to construct his principal 
residence on the land, the Department Regulations state that the 
lien against the buyer will arise by operation of law, and the instru-
ment of transfer must state that the amount of the tax of which the 
seller has been relieved is a "lien running on the land. . . until the 
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tax has been paid or the purchaser has filed a statement with the 
Department ... that the dwelling has been constructed and occu-
pied with the conditions previously certified." Vermont Land Gains 
Tax Reg. No. 1.10007-3(b); 1.10005(c)-7(a). 
The legislature also amended the law to ease the burden on the 
surviving joint owner of property. 32 V.S.A. § 10005(d) (1974) 
amending 32 V.S.A. § 10005(d) (1973). 
34 More empirical research into the actual effects of land use con-
trols has been urged. See d'Arge, Economic Policies, Environmental 
Problems, and Land Use, in ENVIRONMENT: A NEW Focus FOR LAND-
USE PLANNING (McAllister ed. 1973). 
35 Two recent readable and angry books on this subject, especially 
the process of subdivision without construction, are A. WOLFF, UN-
REAL ESTATE (Sierra Club, 1973) and L. DOWNE, MORTGAGE ON 
AMERICA (1974). 
36 See M. CLAWSON, NEGOTIATION AND LAND CONVERSION (Re-
sources for the Future, 1970). 
37 In the Vermont context, the property tax relief provisions par-
tially funded by the land gains tax were in part aimed at the prop-
erty tax increases brought on by increased valuations of parcels that 
weren't sold, but were comparable to those that were. Professor 
Donald Hagman of the University of California, Los Angeles, refers 
to this phenomenon as floating value-where the scarcity of parcels 
for sale means that those that do sell go for high prices, leading tax 
assessors to assume erroneously that comparable unsold parcels 
would bring the same or similar returns when in fact a large offering 
would depress the market. See SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF A CALI-
FORNIA TOMORROW LEGAL SEMINAR ON THE USE AND REGULATION OF 
LAND, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 9 (1974). 
38 The author hopes that readers would respond by indicating 
whether the following analysis is corroborated by their own experi-
ence in Vermont or elsewhere, since this discussion is designed to 
undertake rather than conclude a study of land market interven-
tions such as the Vermont tax. In short, the following analysis is not 
designed to be a definitive solution but only the beginning of an 
excursion into understanding. 
39 See Corty, The Land Market and Transfer Process, in RURAL 
LAND TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 195 (A. Bertrand and F. L. 
Corty, eds. 1962). 
40 When an individual land owner's response to a particular offer-
ing price is plotted on the graph, the average of those responses can 
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be plotted as a rough curve commonly known as a supply curve. It 
is important to note that a variety of factors will affect the shape of 
the curve including holding costs. market expectations, and regula-
tory land use controls. 
41 Land demand may be a function of population growth and 
migration, economic growth, costs of borrowing, transportation 
problems such as no gasoline, market expectations and the availa-
bility of attractive alternative investment. See generally, Corty, 
supra note 3 at 195. 
42 For purposes of illustration assume the transaction costs in-
volved are insignificant, although later in this discussion that as-
sumption is challenged. 
Some economists may argue that a land market is a fiction since 
nonfungible commodities are involved and the choice of alternatives 
is usually made within a localized context. Nevertheless, this article 
sets forth a supply and demand analysis since such an analysis 
would apply even in localized markets and is also useful in itself to 
illustrate the inflation-withdrawal responses discussed below. 
43 See text at notes 12-16. 
44 The land gains tax paid is apparently treated by the Internal 
Revenue Service as a selling expense resulting in a decrease in the 
net gain taxable for federal income tax purposes. Thus changes in 
the supply schedule may be less severe because the land gains tax 
has partially replaced what might otherwise be taxable gain or in-
come for federal income tax purposes. 
The Vermont Department of Taxation has obtained an Internal 
Revenue Service private ruling on the treatment of the land gains 
tax. Conversation with Vermont Tax Commissioner Robert Lathrop 
in early fall of 1974. See also Vermont Land Gains Tax Reg. No. 
1.10001-2 which provides 
The Land Gains Tax itself is a transfer tax for the purpose of the Federal 
Income Tax and is therefore a selling expense. Thus, in determining 
Federal Income Tax the Land Gains Tax will be a deduction against 
ordinary income or will reduce amount realized depending on whether 
the seller is in the business of selling land, an investor in land or whether 
he is in some other category. However, in determining the amount of 
gain for the purpose of the Land Gains Tax, this tax itself cannot reduce 
the amount realized. 
45 Studies of investor responses to capital gains tax rate differ-
ences provided by transfer postponement are few, but the studies 
that have been done indicate that investors responding to favorable 
treatment of long term gain under the Internal Revenue Code elect 
to postpone transfers in order to take advantage of tax rate differen-
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tials. It is uncertain whether the conclusion of these studies would 
apply to the land gains tax experience since they were based on large 
marginal tax rate differences between short and long term gain real-
izations-l1.5% to 65.7% depending upon the adjusted gross income 
of the taxpayer involved. See Hinrichs, An Empirical Measure of 
Investors' Responsiveness to Differentials in Capital Gains Tax 
Rates Among Income Groups, 16 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 224 (1963); 
Fredland, Gray, and Sunley, Jr., The Six Month Holding Period for 
Capital Gains: An Empirical Analysis of Its Effect on the Timing 
of Gains, 21 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 467 (1968). 
By contrast, the yearly incremental exemption provided by the 
Vermont land gains tax is small (5 to 10 percent without considering 
the modulating effect of federal income taxation) though the advan-
tage of full term postponement from the first to the sixth year can 
mean savings for the seller of up to 60% of the gain realized. 
48 The unavailability under the land gains tax of an offset for 
losses realized on sales of other parcels in Vermont makes it unlikely 
that the supply schedules before and after the land gains tax would 
cross at the price at which capital gains just balance capital losses 
on land transfers. See Somers, An Economic Analysis of the Capital 
Gains Tax, 1 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 226,229 (1948); Gemmill, The 
Effect of the Capital Gains Tax on Asset Prices, 9 NATIONAL TAX 
JOURNAL 289 (1956); Holt, A Note on R. F. Gemmill's Article, "The 
Effect of the Capital Gains Tax on Asset Prices", 10 NATIONAL TAX 
JOURNAL 186 (1957). 
Both Somers and Gemmill made their analyses on the assump-
tion that the capital gains tax on income applied at a uniform rate 
rather than on a variable rate based on the length of time the asset 
was held. This led to their analyses imputing only an inflationary 
effect, rather than a withdrawal effect, on capital asset supply. Such 
an "inflationary" analysis is inadequate for the Vermont context. 
Gemmill argues that Somer's assumption that investors will auto-
matically increase the asking price of property sold to cover the 
average net capital tax liability is erroneous when applied to the 
investor interested in capital gains as opposed to income. If his 
analysis is correct, inflation may be only a partial response to con-
templated land gains tax liability. See Gemmill, supra, at 292-95. 
Participants in the land market act with differing degrees of so-
phistication. While some institutional market participants or so-
phisticated individuals may in time devise ways of avoiding the tax 
completely, many transferors and transferees will elect to avoid the 
tax, if at all, by taking advantage of the progressive exemption for 
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a long-term holding or by electing an alternative investment. The 
contraction in "supply" may be augmented by the tax relief pro-
gram's removal of some of the burden on low-income land owners 
who might be forced to sell land to pay real property taxes. 
47 The withdrawal effect for prospective land market participants 
is likely to be accentuated by the unavailability of any offset for 
losses realized from sales of Vermont land under the land gains tax. 
48 Part of this demand analysis assumes that a number of partici-
pants will be affected by the gains tax on resale, despite the modu-
lating effect of federal income taxation. See supra note 44. 
49 The president of one land investment concern has indicated 
these responses-withdrawal, inflation, deflation-to be strategies 
he has observed in Vermont since the tax became effective. Conver-
sation with Dick Perkins of Landvest, Inc., on September 26, 1974. 
50 This effect illustrates the "hidden" taxation effects that may 
be involved in market intervention devices such as the land gains 
tax. The tax that produces price declines takes money from a pro-
spective seller as effectively as one which separates him from the 
profits of his sale more directly through collection of a tax such as 
the Vermont land gains tax. However, the gains tax may merely 
accelerate or dampen price shifts produced primarily by other 
causes rather than altering existing price trends completely. 
51 The amount of land transferred may be determined more 
strongly by other causes with the gains tax only modulating such 
stronger market forces. 
52 At some point it might be useful to construct a more sophisti-
cated model of the land market which could take advantage of some 
of the recent advances in systems analysis. But until data is gath-
ered and a suitable analysis made, perhaps with some computer 
assistance, lawyers interested in this field will have to rely on the 
more classical static models. See also supra note 42. 
53 See text accompanying note 33. 
M See Myers, supra note 3. 
55 See text accompanying notes 26 and 33. 
56 Outside of second home industry, the Vermont pattern for resi-
dential construction is that a builder buys a subdivided lot, con-
structs a house with bank financing, and sells the package to a 
prospective homeowner. Conversation with Vermont Planning 
Director Arthur Risteau, September 12,1974. The few residential lot 
owners who arrange their own construction would also be classified 
as builders even though they do not undertake construction with the 
anticipation of immediate resale. Also, owners of land which is to 
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be developed into office buildings, apartments, shopping centers, 
etc. would also be classified as builders even though the practice is 
often for a general contractor to undertake construction. Thus, 
builders are distinguished from other market participants by the 
effect of their decisions in placing structures on the land. 
57 The effects of "taxation" here would include both the tax paid 
directly to the state and the indirect tax paid from any price incre-
ment abatement induced by the gains tax effect on land demand. 
See supra note 50. 
58 See supra note 33. 
59 Many recreational lots are not built upon immediately, but are 
acquired more for investment purposes than for construction. See 
text accompanying note 65, infra. This effect may in part be derived 
from the merchandising efforts of land subdivision companies. See 
Wolff, supra note 35. 
60 See supra note 59. 
61 Because of the 1974 amendment, the impact on subdividers 
who sell lots for primary residences will be less severe than on those 
who sell recreatimlal homesites. See supra note 33. 
62 The allocation problem is one of the thorniest issues confront-
ing the Vermont Department of Taxation and the regulations pro-
mulgated by the Department are not much clearer than the statute, 
providing only that gain realized between land and structures must 
be made on the basis offair market value. See Vermont Land Gains 
Tax Reg. No. 1.10005(b)-3. 
63 The effect of the land gains tax on such participant bypass is 
explored below. 
64 The argument has been raised that speculators are a proper 
part of any land market system, acting as insurers who assume this 
risk of land price increases or decreases (See L. ROSE, TAXATION OF 
LAND VALUE INCREMENTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO REZONING (Economic Re-
search Center, University of Hawaii, 1971) at 42), or acting as land 
bankers who acquire land in advance of need in order to release it 
later at periods of high demand, thus modulating price swings that 
might otherwise be produced because of lack of intermediaries. (See 
Elias and Gillies, Some Observations on the Role of Speculators and 
Speculation in Land Development, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 789 (1965).) 
Others argue either that short-term speculation serves no banking 
function, or that it is inherently inflationary. See Note, State Taxa-
tion-Use of Taxing Power to Achieve Environmental Goals: Ver-
mont Taxes Gains Realized from the Sale or Exchange of Land Held 
Less Than Six Years-Vermont Statute Ann. tit. 32, §§ 10001-1 
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(1973), 49 WASH. L. REV. 1159, 1163 (1974); ONTARIO MINISTRY OF 
ECONOMICS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE LAND SPECULATION 
TAX (1974). 
As far as short-term speculation is concerned, the critics appear 
to have the better argument. First, it is questionable whether analo-
gies from the grain futures market as argued by Elias and Gillies 
bear any relation to the land market, which has little seasonal "sup-
ply" problem. Moreover, the transfer costs of continued sale and 
resale can contribute significantly to the rising cost of land. 
Even if the land market is analogous to the grain market, and the 
land speculator serves a useful purpose in purchasing land in times 
of plenty and selling land in times of scarcity, it is questionable 
whether the land market operates in such short cycles that the 
speculator penalized by the land gains tax will be the speculator 
who is operating in the "banking" capacity suggested. In short, will 
not the speculator most severely affected be the short-term, high-
profit speculator who is attempting to ride a market crest upward 
rather than one who buys at depressed prices and holds for the long 
term to sell at higher prices? 
85 This problem is acute in the second-home lot development 
where only a few subdivided lots are ever built upon. According to 
one recent source, six recreational lots were sold nationwide in 1971 
for every home constructed. See TASK FORCE ON LAND USE AND 
URBAN GROWTH, CITIZENS' ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZENS GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 264 
(1973). 
Thus to the extent that more Vermont open space stays in unbro-
ken parcels until it is ripe for development, the opportunity is in-
creased for the land plan for a Vermont parcel to be successfully 
integrated with subsequent construction. This is particularly impor-
tant since a poorly designed subdivision can do more environmental 
harm than ugly buildings on it. THE USE OF LAND described the 
process this way: 
If past experience is any guide, many of the lots now being created will 
never be used at all: in this case, it is, "lots first, buildings never." The 
lot lines will remain on the record books, though, and land titles will 
become ever more clouded as decades pass. Tough for the land buyers? 
Yes. Tough also for the environment as is shown by any number of 
"dead subdivisions" created forty of firty years ago. If a few scattered 
lots are built upon, the subdivision may become a sparsely settled rural 
slum .... Once the countryside has been given over to quarter acre or 
I-acre lots (and most recreational lots sold in 1971 were one-quarter to 
I-acre in size), you can forget thoughts of clustering, variable densities, 
THE VERMONT EXPERIMENT 469 
common open spaces, and the like .... the lot lines will survive to block 
sensitive use of the land. 
Id. at 275-76. 
For additional discussion of the environmental problems of poor 
land planning, see I. McHARG, DESIGN WITH NATURE (1969); Toner 
and Thurow, Let Nature Decide the Land Use, 40 PLANNING 17 
(January 1974). 
Note also the additional pressures on subdividers from the Inter-
state Land Sales Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720, new regulations pub-
lished, 38 Fed. Reg. 23866-23909 (Sept. 4, 1973). The Act exempts 
from filing requirements lots on which buildings have been erected 
(or are required to be erected) within two years. 15 U.S.C. § 1702. 
Finally, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has 
recently been enjoined from approving the interstate. land sales fil-
ing for a 3,000 lot development on 7000 acres of Oklahoma land for 
lack of an environmental impact statement required by the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act. Scenic Rivers Association v. 
Lynn, 7 E.R.C. 1172 (E.D. Okla. 1974). 
66 See supra note 3. 
67 The traditional method of dealing with the preservation of agri-
cultural land has been to lower tax rates to reflect the agricultural 
use. See generally Note, Property Taxation of Agricultural and 
Open Space Land, 8 HARV. J. LEGIS 158 (1970). Such measures have, 
however, been criticized as relieving the sale induced by high taxa-
tion, but not protecting against the unrefusable offer. To the extent 
the gains tax intervenes in demand for such land, it may begin to 
attack the "forgotten" side of the preservation issue. 
For example, in 1945 there were over 30,000 farms in Massachu-
setts and over two million acres in production. By 1973, the number 
of farms had dwindled to 5,700 with only 700,000 acres in farm use. 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON FOOD, JUNE 25,1974,32; THE COMMISSION 
TASK FORCE #1 FINAL REPORT ON FOOD SUPPLY AND PRODUCTION, 2. 
This uneasy situation-especially when energy sources are in-
creasingly uncertain-makes the preservation of farmland close to 
population centers of more than nostalgic concern. (For other dis-
cussion of the importance of agriculture, but in the context of the 
property tax, see Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 653-54). 
Thus, to the extent that the land gains tax prevents farmland 
from being subdivided and sold when no buildings will be needed 
for some time (the recreational lot pattern, for instance), it will buy 
some time to begin to work on the problem of food. 
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68 32 V.S.A. ch. 231 (1970). 
69 The major non-taxable transfers are transfers to secure or dis-
charge a debt, and some intra-family gratuitious transfers. 
70 Letter from Commissioner Robert Lathrop dated October 1, 
1974. The tax is self-regulating to a degree. To the extent its land 
market effects curtail land value appreciation, the staggered rate 
schedule means less profit may be drawn off by the tax directly. If 
on the other hand, the effect of the tax is to cause land market 
effects that add to land value increments, the same rate structure 
will capture a larger portion for the state. 
71 See NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 212-13 (1966); 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING 
THE AMERICAN CITY, 391-92 (Douglas Chmn. 1968); Harriss, Alterna-
tive Bases for Real Estate Taxation, in PROPERTY TAXES 219 
(1940); Harvith, Subdivision Dedication Requirements-Some 
Observations and an Alternative: A Special Tax on Gain from 
Realty, 33 ALB. L. REV. 474 (1969); Lent, The Taxation of Land 
Value, 41 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 89 (1967); 
Spengler, The Taxation of Urban Land Value Increments, 17 
JOURNAL OF LAND AND PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 54 (1941); L. 
ROSE, TAXATION OF LAND VALUE INCREMENTS ATI'RIBUTABLE TO 
REZONING (Econ. Research Center, University of Hawaii, 1971). 
Walker, Taxation of Land Value Increases, 38 TAX POLICY Nos. 8-9 
(1971). 
Land value increment taxation has been in use for some time 
outside the Anglo-Saxon countries in Israel, some African and Latin 
American countries, Denmark and Spain, and Taiwan, See Lent 
and Netzer, supra; communication from Orville F. Grimes, Jr., of 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Jan. 14, 
1975. 
72 In February, 1974, Representative Ora J. Halvorson introduced 
into the Montana legislature a modified version of the Vermont tax 
as House Bill No. 651. After being reported out favorably by the 
Taxation Committee, it was killed by the House on a 48-39 vote. 
Representative Halvorson indicates she intends to reintroduce the 
bill again in some form in the 1975 legislative session. Conversation 
with Representative Halvorson on July 23, 1974. 
House Bill 651, as approved by the Committee on Taxation, was 
similar to the 1973 Vermont land gains tax (before the 1974 amend-
ments) with several important differences. First, the Montana tax 
would be collected by a filing of a return and payment of any tax 
due when the transferor filed his Montana income tax return, 
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though losses, as in Vermont, would not apparently be available to 
offset gains. Second, the act would not apply to the sale, lease, or 
agreement to buy and sell land where the parties to the transaction 
enter into a covenant running with the land, which is revocable only 
after a period of at least six years, that the land will be used exclu-
sively for agricultural purposes. Finally, the revenues obtained from 
the tax would be paid into the general fund, and not earmarked for 
special purposes as in Vermont. 
73 House Bill 502. The agricultural exemption may have question-
able utility as a means of preserving farmlands. See supra note 67. 
Also, as in 1973 Vermont legislation, the proposed Washington bill 
provides a one-acre residential homesite exemption. 
74 For a readable brief history of the recent emergence of special 
real estate gain taxes in parts of the Anglo-Saxon World (Vermont), 
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand see D. Hag-
man and D. Misczynski, Special Capital and Real Estate Windfall 
Taxes (Screwts)-A Short Story (unpublished paper for the British 
Columbia Institute for Economic Policy Analysis Conference on the 
Pricing of Local Services and Effects on Urban Spatial Structure, 
June 26, 28, 1974, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.) The au-
thor wishes to acknowledge his debt to Professor Hagman in alerting 
him to these developments. 
75 The Land Speculation Tax Act was designed to curb escalating 
housing costs (close to 2 percent a month, compounded) by attack-
ing land speculation which the government felt artificially fueled 
land price increases. Conversation on July 18,1974 with Larry Leon-
ard of the Tax and Fiscal Policy Branch, Ministry of Treasury Eco-
nomics and Intergovernmental Affairs, Province of Ontario. 
As to the Ontario tax itself, with one exception discussed below, 
there is no abatement for the length of time the land was held by 
the transferor. 
Like the 1974 Vermont Tax, the Land Speculation Tax exempts 
the primary residence of the transferor, but it also extends that 
exemption to include transfers of the transferor's principal recrea-
tional property and up to 20 acres of surrounding land, unless the 
disposition is to a non-resident person as defined in Land Transfer 
Tax Act, 1974. (Ontario also enacted the Land Transfer Tax Act, 
1974, which provides for a tax of twenty percent of the consideration 
paid for any transfer to or in trust for any transferee who is a nonres-
ident. Statutes of Ontario, 1974, Chapter 8, as amended by 1974, 
Chapter 16. The tax was aimed at deterring foreign investment 
which had escalated the cost of Ontario land, especially in the To-
472 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
ronto Area. Conversation with Larry Leonard, supra). 
Like the proposed Montana legislation, the Ontario tax attempts 
to protect agricultural transfers, providing an exemption for land 
actively used in farming which is disposed of to a member of the 
transferor's family or to a farming corporation for the purpose of 
enabling the transferor to carryon farming. 
Instead of providing a blanket exemption for structures, like Ver-
mont, the Land Speculation Tax provides total exemption if the 
sale involves structures meeting certain specific criteria. For exam-
ple, the disposition is exempt if it involves land on which the struc-
tures were constructed or renovated by the transferor, and such 
improvements meet certain threshold values, or land on which the 
structures account for 40 percent or more of the sale proceeds and 
are used for commercial, industrial or tourist resort purposes. Tax 
Act, Sections 1.-(l)(b); 4.(9); 4.(d). 
Apartment rental property disposed of after April 9, 1977, consti-
tuting 40 percent of a parcel's fair market value, qualifies for a thirty 
percent reduction in the tax with an additional ten percent reduc-
tion for each year thereafter during which the property is held with-
out disposition. Tax Act, Section 20.(1) and (2). This provision con-
stitutes the closest analogue to the long term holding exemption 
provided by the Vermont rate schedule. 
Finally, dispositions of subdivided land are exempt if the trans-
feror assumes the liability for the tax and begins construction on at 
least half of the lots sold to him within nine months and on the 
remainder within eighteen months. 
76 On August 22, 1973 New Zealand enacted the Property Specu-
lation Tax Act, 1973 (No. 18) applying to dispositions taking place 
after June 15 of that year. 
The Act, as implied from its name, was designed to penalize 
property speculation which was not defined in the Act but has been 
defined by the inland revenue department as "the trafficking in 
land with a view to short term profits and without having contrib-
uted any worthwhile improvements in the period between purchase 
and sale." HEAD OFFICE, INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, PROPERTY 
SPECULATION TAX EXPLANATORY NOTES AT 1. (November, 1973). 
Unlike Vermont, but like Ontario, the Property Speculation Tax 
defines land to include structures on the land. Section 2(1). INLAND 
REVENUE DEPARTMENT, PROPERTY SPECULATION TAX EXPLANATORY 
NOTES at 1 (November, 1973). 
Also like Ontario, the New Zealand Tax contains exemptions for 
certain land in which the transferor has constructed improvements 
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or undertaken renovation of certain threshold costs. Section 20 (no 
express provision applying to subdivision). 
Like Vermont (as amended) the New Zealand Act provides an 
exemption for transfers of land acquired for the purpose of occu-
pancy or construction of a residence, (provided profit wa.s not a 
motive) though there is no requirement of construction within a 
limited time. The act also exempts certain transfers of business 
property (other than property involved in the business ofland devel-
opment). Section 19. 
Finally, unlike Vermont, the New Zealand tax provides that 
losses arising from short term dispositions of land may offset subse-
quent gains until the loss is exhausted. Section 10. 
77 The British Finance Act 1974 contained a complicated set of 
provisions designed to tax certain gains arising on the disposal of 
land and buildings at ordinary income rather than more favorable 
capital gains rates. In addition to other exemptions where the total 
proceeds of all disposals of land and buildings by an individual in a 
tax year do not exceed £10,000, no part of the new gains would be 
subject to the special tax. Sections 38 and 39. 
78 315 A.2d 860, 865-66 (Vt 1974). On the enactment issue, the 
Vermont Supreme Court held that since the trial court had found 
that the primary purpose of the land gains tax was to raise revenue 
to fund the tax relief program, it need not have originated in the 
House, since only "revenue bills" enacted to produce general reve-
nue were required to originate there. The court also noted that since 
the revenue-raising provisions were germane to the subject matter 
of the whole bill, they could properly have been raised for considera-
tion as an amendment by the Senate. 
Appellants had also claimed that the tax was unconstitutionally 
discriminatory. 
Their first two claims were: (1) that the one-acre residential ex-
emption had discriminatory effects on rural landowners (since rural 
zoning regulations often required a five-acre minimum residential 
lot), and (2) that nonresidents were discouraged from purchasing 
property subject to the gains tax. (This latter argument is discussed 
in more detail below in the text.) The court found that appellants 
had failed to introduce any evidence to establish that such discrimi-
nation occurred. 
Appellants next argued that sellers were already burdened with 
a Vermont income tax on gains derived from the sale or exchange 
of capital assets, including land. To this the court responded that 
the legislative intent to burden those already taxed was clear. 
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As to the final issue, the reasonableness of the six year classifica-
tion, the court said: 
a quantitative distinction created by the legislature will be upheld un-
less it is so "wide of the mark" that it cannot be said to tend toward 
achievement of any legislative purpose it might be said to serve. 
The court said that the legislature's discretion was especially broad 
in the field of taxation, and that appellants had not shown it to be 
unreasonable. Andrews v. Lathrop, supra at 864-65. 
All parties in the Andrews case apparently operated under the 
assumption that Vermont's state constitution imposed no greater 
equal protection restriction than that of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Andrews v. Lathrop, Brief for Appellant at 1-16. Whether a 
land gains tax enacted in a jurisdiction having a more stringent 
state constitutional equalization provision would survive a chal-
lenge is uncertain in light of the tax's variable rates and applicabil-
ity to only one class of real property-land. See generally, W. NEW-
HOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION 
(1959). 
79 See Note, State Taxation, etc., supra note 2. 
80 Andrews v. Lathrop, 315 A.2d 860, 863 (Vt. 1974). 
81 This evidentiary failure and the Court's response might use-
fully be contrasted to the successful attack on a growth control 
scheme enacted by the City of Petaluma, California, because of 
unconstitutional interference with the right to travel of prospective 
homebuyers. Association of Sonoma City, et al. v. City of Petaluma, 
__ F. Supp. __ (N.D. Cal. 1974). Counsel for one of the Petal-
uma plaintiffs has credited part of the success in the District Court 
to a carefully laid foundation of expert testimony on the likely eco-
nomic effect of the plan on the market for housing in the San Fran-
cisco Bay area and its coincident effect on the prospective Petaluma 
homebuyer. Address by Malcom A. Misuraca, American Law Insti-
tute-American Bar Association Conference on Land Use Litiga-
tion, Chicago, June 8, 1974. 
82 Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st 
Cir. 1972). 
83 Andrews v. Lathrop, 315 A.2d 860 (Vt. 1974), brief for Appel-
lant, at 19-20. This argument arose in the context of equal protec-
tion, but has overtones of unconstitutional interference with inter-
state commerce. For a useful recent discussion of this issue oriented 
around the Oregon Minimum Deposit Act, which was designed to 
discourage the use of throwaway beverage containers, see, Note, 
State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce 
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Clause, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1762 (1974). See also, Note, Constitutional 
Law-State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-Commerce Clause 
Analysis, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 380 (1974). 
84 Andrews v. Lathrop, 315 A.2d 860 (Vt. 1974), brieffor Appellee 
at 13-16. 
85 Andrews v. Lathrop, 315 A.2d 860 (Vt. 1974), Record, at 3-7. 
88 For a general discussion of the Taking Issue, see F. BOSSELMAN, 
D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); reviewed by Hag-
man, 87 HARv. L. REV. 482 (1973). 
87 Territory v. Daniels, 6 Utah 288, 22 P. 159 (1889). 
88 Id., 6 Utah at 297, 22 P. at 162. 
89 The dominant rule is set forth in Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 
78 (1881). In that case, 80 acres of land in Pennsylvania were, 
through an act of the legislature, placed within the boundaries of 
the City of Pittsburgh, and assessed by the city to pay a water tax, 
gas tax and street tax. The landowner, Kelly, attacked the munici-
pal taxation of his property without due process of law in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment on several grounds, including that he 
received no benefit from these taxes. The Supreme Court turned 
aside his claim: 
We cannot say judicially that Kelly received no benefit from the city 
organization. These streets, if they do not penetrate his farm, lead to 
it. The water-works will probably reach him someday, and may be near 
enough to him now to serve him on some occasion. The schools may 
receive his children, and in this regard he can be in no worse condition 
than those living in the city who have no children, and yet who pay for 
the support of the schools. . . . This court cannot say in such cases, 
however great the hardship or unequal the burden, that the tax collected 
for such purposes is taking the property of the taxpayer without due 
process of law. 
104 U.S. at 82-83. The Daniels court distinguished Kelly on the 
grounds that Kelly was based on the Fourteenth Amendment and 
not the Fifth Amendment, which was not then applicable to the 
states. Territory v. Daniels, 6 Utah 288, 300-01, 22 P. 159, 163 
(1889). 
But Kelly has proved to be the dominant line of cases (see 
NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 1.41[2] (Rev. 3rd ed. 1974)) and in-
deed Utah itself later adopted the Kelly rationale. Kimball v. 
Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1(1899), overruling Kaysville 
City v. Elliston, 18 Utah 163, 55 P. 386 (1898). 
The Kimball court laid great stress on the perils of an anticipated 
flood of litigation from aggrieved taxpayers if the principles of 
Daniels were followed. 
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90 172 U.S. 269 (1898). See generally cases cited in NICHOLS, EMI-
NENT DOMAIN, § 1.41[4] (Rev. 3rd ed. 1974). 
91 172 U.S. at 279. Appellants in Andrews did not explicitly adopt 
the just compensation arguments made in these cases, but they 
raised them implicitly in their brief. Andrews v. Lathrop, 315 A.2d 
860 (1974), brief of Appellants at 10. In any case, appellants did not 
press the argument and the court did not deal with it in its opinion. 
92 Alco Parking Corp. v. Pittsburgh, 453 Pa. 245, 307 A.2d 851 
(1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 369, (1974); Noted 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 335 
(1973); 26 HAST. L.J. 215 (1974). 
93 Philadelphia v. Eglin's Garages, Inc., 342 Pa. 142, 19 A.2d 845 
(1941); Philadelphia v. Samuels, 338 Pa. 321, 12 A.2d 79 (1940). 
94 307 A.2d at 860 [citations omitted]. 
95 [d. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 
(1964). Professor Sax subsequently revised his own earlier analysis. 
See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE. L.J. 
(1971). 
98 Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corporation, 417 U.S. 369 (1974). 
97 A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40. (1934) (Magnano 
sustained a state excise tax of 15 cents per pound on all butter 
substitutes sold within the state.) 
98 [d. at 44. 
99 [d. 
100 291 U.S. 619 (1934). 
101 417 U.S. 369, 377 (1974). The court ,also noted that even if "an 
uncompensated and hence forbidden 'taking' could be inferred from 
an unreasonably high tax in the context of competition from the 
taxing authority," the record in the case did not indicate that gov-
ernment competition itself was the source of the harm since a shor-
tage of parking spaces meant that if the private facility operators 
were damaged, the damage would come from those who could no 
longer afford the increased price for downtown parking at all, not 
from those who preferred the cheaper public parking lots. 417 U.S. 
at 378. 
102 Mr. Justice Powell concurred in a separate opinion in order 
to emphasize my understanding that today's decision does not fore-
close the possibility that some combination of unreasonably burden-
some taxation and direct competition by the taxing authority might 
amount to a taking of property without just compensation in violation 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments .... It is conceivable 
[however] that punitive taxation of a private industry and direct eco-
nomic competition through a governmental entity enjoying special com-
petitive advantages would effectively expropriate a private business for 
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public profit. Such a combination of unreasonably burdensome taxation 
and public competition would be the functional equivalent of govern-
mental taking of private property for public use and would be subject 
to the constitutional requirement of just compensation. 
417 U.S. at 379. 
103 Alco Parking Corporation v. City of Pittsburgh, 453 Pa. 245, 
307 A.2d 851, 860 (1973). 
104 "According to one responsible calculation, holding costs for 
undeveloped land amount to roughly one-fifth of its value annually. 
Thus, unless the price more than doubles each five years, the specu-
lator will lose." G. LEFCOE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW, 1 (2nd ed. 
1974). 
105 See Alco Parking Corp. and Magnano discussed at notes 98-
105; See also Zimmerman, supra note 1 at 645, n. 10. 
106 See the remarks of Vermont Governor Salmon concerning the 
purpose of the land gains tax, quoted supra in text at note 26. 
107 • • .It is by now beyond question that the legislature may legislate 
to achieve particular social and economic ends by the manner in which 
a tax is imposed, even if such objectives might otherwise be beyond the 
legislature's constitutional powers .... The objective may extend to 
discouragement of what is otherwise, as here, a legitimate economic 
activity. 
132 Vt. at 262, 315 A.2d at 863-864. In so holding the court marked 
a reaffirmation of continued judicial recognition that a social pur-
pose will not render a tax invalid. See Zimmerman, supra note 1 at 
645, n. 10. 
108 G. LEFCOE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW (2nd ed. 1974); C. L. HAR-
RISS, ED., THE GOOD EARTH OF AMERICA (1974); F. BOSSELMAN & D. 
CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971). 
109 See for example, the proposed indirect source and transporta-
tion controls under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857(f); 39 Fed. 
Reg. 25292 (July 9, 1974) and 39 Fed. Reg. 30440 (August 22, 1974); 
see also Batchelder, Land Use/Transportation Controls for Air 
Quality, 6 URB. LAWYER 235 (1974); King, Federal Land Use Con-
trols for Clean Air, 3 ENV. AFF. 507 (1974); and Federal WaterPollu-
tion Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1288 which requires states to develop 
areawide or regional waste treatment management plans, including 
land use controls. 
110 In a sense, this constitutes the "equal protection" component 
of the "taking" issue. For an elaboration, see D. Hagman, Windfalls 
for Wipeouts in C. L. HARRISS, ED., THE GOOD EARTH OF AMERICA, 
109-133 (1974); Hagman, A New Deal: Trading Windfalls for 
Wipeouts, 40 PLANNING __ (SEPT., 1974). 
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111 COSTONIS, J., SPACE ADRIFT-LANDMARK PRESERVATION AND THE 
MARKETPLACE (1974); Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning 
and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 
(1972). 
112 Chavooshian & Norman, Transfer of Development Rights: A 
New Concept in Land Use Management, 32 URBAN LAND (ULI) 11 
(Dec., 1973). 
113 Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for 
Land Use Control, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35 (1974). 
114 See supra note 111 and Costonis, Development Rights 
Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L. J. 75 (1973). Costonis, 
Development Rights Transfer: Easing the Police-Power-Eminent 
Domain Deadlock, 26 LAND USE AND ZONING DIGEST (ASPO) 6 
(1974); Anyway You Slice It, DRT Is Here to Say, 40 PLANNING 10 
(July, 1974); Shlaes, Who Pays for Transfer of Development Rights? 
40 PLANNING 7 (July, 1974). See also URBAN LAND (January, 1975) 
which contains an extensive bibliography and is entirely devoted to 
the subject. 
115 Three private market variants of TDR concept can be illus-
trated in a simplified manner as follows: 
(a) Bulk TDR: Owner of parcel A can, under the local zoning by-
law, build a structure with a Floor Area Ratio (F.A.R.) of 4. By 
acquiring adjacent and similar parcel B, he can now go up 8 stories 
on parcel A, having aggregated parcels A and B for purposes of 
F.A.R. Suppose, however, that parcel B is not adjacent, but down 
the street. Why can't owner A aggregate it as well? And why buy 
parcel B at all? Why not just buy the "air" rights? It is only a small 
step to transferable development rights (with thanks to Donald H. 
Siskind, Esq., of the New York Bar). See also Pedowitz, Transfer 
of Air Rights and Development Rights, 9 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 
J. 183 (1974). 
(b) Space TDR: Jurisdiction A enacts a subdivision controlor-
dinance in accordance with appropriate enabling legislation as fol-
lows: 
1. The subdivision of land into two or more lots without a permit from 
the (agency) is unlawful. 
2. No permit shall be granted for the subdivision of any parcel where 
any resulting lot is less than (number) acres in size. 
3. The owner of any parcel for which a subdivision permit has been 
issued may transfer such permit to become appurtenant to other land, 
but no additional permit shall be issued by the (agency) for the parcel 
to which the permit transferred was originally appurtenant unless suffi-
cient land remains to qualify for another permit. 
THE VERMONT EXPERIMENT 479 
4. An owner may subdivide land into lots of whatever size he desires 
so long as the number of lots subdivided is equal to or less than the 
number of lot permits he holds either initially or as transferee, and such 
permits must be surrendered to the (agency) upon recording of the sub-
division plan. 
Such an ordinance would convert a minimum lot size ordinance 
into a crude TDR scheme, though it may have exclusionary effects 
and also lacks the land plan whereby preservation and transfer dis-
tricts are chosen. 
(c) Parking TDR: Parking spaces as a form of TDR have re-
cently received a modified endorsement in South Terminal Corpora-
tion v. EPA, 6 ERC 2025 (1974). South Terminal involved a require-
ment under the Clean Air Act transportation control plan for the 
Boston region containing provisions requiring a freeze on parking 
spaces in designated areas, and requiring operators of private, off-
street parking facilities in the "core" area to keep 40 percent of their 
facilities vacant from 7 to 10 a.m. on work days. The affected opera-
tors, among other objections, attacked the regulations as a taking 
without compensation in a petition for review of the plan before the 
First Circuit court of appeals. In turning aside the claim, the court 
noted that the plan regulated only one use of petitioner's land: 
The right to use is not extinguished entirely; nor is it transferred to 
anyone else. Indeed, the ingenuity of operators may result in fewer dis-
advantages than urged. For example, some operators may be able to 
"buy" from others the right to use spaces, leaving the seller of spaces 
free to use the land under his parking lot for other purposes while the 
buyer enjoys a higher occupancy rate. 
6 ERC at 2044. 
116 Carmichael, supra note 113 at 47. 
117 See McHarg, supra note 65. 
118 INTERNATIONAL INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE, THE COMMUNITY LAND 
TRUST, A GUIDE TO A NEW MODEL OF LAND TENURE IN AMERICA (1972). 
119 Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land 
as Property, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 1038 (1973); See also Bosselman and 
Callies, supra note 108 at 314-318; also Bosselman, Callies and 
Banta, supra note 86 at 240: 
The idea that a regulation of the use of land which prevents the owner 
from making money can amount to a taking assumes that a landowner 
has a constitutional right to use and develop his land from some purpose 
which will result in personal profit, regardless of the effect that such 
development will have on the public. Such a holding gives land as a 
commodity a constitutional status higher than other commodities-a 
status land no longer deserves. 
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120 56 Wis.2d. 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), recently followed in New 
Hampshire in Sibson v. State of New Hampshire (N.H. Sup. Ct. 
March 31, 1975). 
121 The Justs argue their property has been severely depreciated in 
value. But this depreciation of value is not based on the use of the land 
in its natural state but on what the land would be worth if it could be 
filled and used for the location of a dwelling. While loss of value is to 
be considered in determining whether a restriction is a constructive 
taking, value based on changing the character of the land at the expense 
of harm to public rights is not an essential factor or controlling. 
56 Wis.2d at 23, 201 N.W.2d at 771 (1972). 
For a useful analysis of the implication of this redefinition of 
"property," especially in terms of valuation for purposes of property 
taxation and eminent domain, see Large, supra note 119, at 1078-
1081. 
122 The concept of "ameliorative waste" is a useful way of focusing 
on the fact that changes in land use intensity have been fostered in 
part by the favorable bias inherent in terms like "development" and 
"improvements." What is more important is to decide whether the 
change is worthwhile in the particular case. For a discussion of 
"ameliorative waste" see generally AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, 
§ 20.11 (1952). In effect the doctrine states that acts may be 
waste even though they increase the value of the land because they 
injure the successor's interest. § 20.11. See also Melms v. Pabst 
Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 738 (1899); Crewe Corp. v. Feiler, 
28 N.J. 316, 146 A.2d 458 (1958). 
123 If this counter-current prevails, in the future years, we may see 
special taxes for the conferral of development rights. Certainly if 
land in its "natural state" is all the owner can claim as his entitle-
ment, then any increment in use intensity beyond that entitlement 
constitutes a benefit conferred by the government which might be 
recaptured through taxation to the extent of the benefit received. 
124 The concept of the land gains tax as an "intermediate step" 
must be fairly credited to Professor George Lefcoe of the University 
of Southern California and Boston University Law Schools since he 
raised it in a conversation with the author in December, 1974 when 
we were discussing some of the thoughts in this article. 
125 Recall that because of the nature of participants in the market, 
the demand for land may usefully be distinguished from the de-
mand for improvements. 
